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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
"The vast majority of new shopping centers...are 
decending on open land outside and between towns. 
The Danger: Main Street America may die in the 
process, deserted by its major stores, left with 
boarded-up storefronts and a few meager retail 
outlets to service those notorious non-customers: 
old people, anyone who can't or won't drive a car 
and join the Great Majority." 
(Pierce, 1978) 
As cities grow, decline and change, planning decisions are made which impact 
on the community's character and shape for decades to come. The social values 
reflected by these decisions should be consistent with the best interest of 
a particular population. One such value being supported consistently by the 
planning profession is the maintenance of a strong, central retail core. De- 
velopment and redevelopment which strengthen and revitalize central business 
districts are becoming more desirable than those which allow suburban fringe 
retail development, most often in the form of shopping malls. 
In The Language of Cities, Charles Abrams described the central business dis- 
trict (CBD) as being 
"the business core of a city with the major concen- 
tration of retail, office, and service functions. 
It is sometimes referred to as 'downtown,' though 
it may in fact be located uptown or midtown. The 
CBD is the city's principal magnet, its mainstay and 
principal taxpayer, generating a quarter or more of 
its local revenues. The CBD is also its office cen- 
ter, the confluence of diversities, the scene of fi- 
nancial and political action, and the source of a 
substantial portion of its jobs. It is the place 
where a man can dine with a lady without being ac- 
cused of having a rendezvous. The cities with a pul- 
sating CBD are generally the cities that thrive; 
those without one are headed for desuetude." 
(Abrams, p.41) 
Generally, this is the most diversified area of a community offering cultural 
activities, social and recreational opportunities, and commercial, institu- 
tional and residential uses. It maintains a unique role in the community in 
this respect. 
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The CBD is also unique in it functions within the community's framework. It 
has three primary functions: 
* providing jobs for local residents; 
* providing an assessment base that supports local 
government services received by other parts of the 
city; 
* acting as the focal point for many aspects of life 
in the general community. 
Downtowns perform these specialized functions more than any other location 
in their regions. There are two main reasons for this. 
"First, it usually has the highest total accessibility 
of any spot in the region (or in the community if it 
is a suburb), and second, it usually has the largest 
accumulation of facilities at any one spot for those 
functions it performs. These two traits also tend to 
reinforce each other. True, other areas perform all 
the functions that downtowns do to some degree, but 
because of these unique traits, downtowns normally per- 
form them to a greater degree." 
(Downs, p.28) 
In the past 60 years, there have been a number of social and economic trends 
which have impacted the function on downtowns. Some have been favorable trends: 
others have been unfavorable. 
One of the most obvious and important factors which has had a decentralizing 
effect on downtowns has been the use of automobiles. This made suburban lo- 
cations more accessible and urban locations less desirable for activities be- 
cause of: 
* traffic congestion; 
* inadequate parking; 
* higher density; and 
* removed need for access to public transportation. 
Some of the other trends which have had an adverse effect on downtowns are: 
* deterioration of many old in-city neighborhoods; 
* withdrawal of many middle-income households to 
the suburbs; 
* technical changes in communications that allow 
lower-level office functions to separate from the 
parent office; and 
* changes in techniques toward one-story factories 
and warehouses. 
Although with these effects the downtown may still be the largest center or 
node in the community, it is no longer totally dominant. Rather it has become 
one of the competing centers. The office-space function has become the domi- 
nant function in regional downtowns as most are becoming more specialized. 
Conversely, however, there are trends which are having a recentralizing impact 
that is more favorable to the role of downtowns. Some of these are: 
* energy prices and shortages making long-distance 
travel from the suburbs less feasible; 
* high cost of new suburban housing; 
* shift to smaller households; 
* increased resistance to further growth in the 
suburbs; 
* increased interest in historical preservation; 
* sharp increase in domestic tourism. 
In developing a strategy for redeveloping a downtown area, the relative impor- 
tance of each of these trends, both adverse and favorable, should be examined 
within the context of each community's needs. In addition, Anthony Downs, a 
Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, proposes a six-point program 
which should be followed in the process. Those six points are: 
* organize some type of downtown-oriented group to 
take charge of an overall improvement program; 
* discover and emphasize downtown's basic strong 
points in whatever plans are created; 
* make downtowns lively - turn them into the center 
of activity, the place "where the action is" 
through as much of the day as possible; 
* provide certain key ingredients to downtowns 
needed to keep them competitive with existing, or 
potential, outlying centers, such as: 
-adequate parking at low cost, 
-building maintenance, 
-constant clean-up activities, 
-good patterns of pedestrian circulation, 
-good patterns for vehicular circulation, 
-personal and property security, 
-joint promotional and advertising efforts 
run by a professional staff; 
* develop follow-on management and promotional capa- 
bilities; 
* be realistic and feasible in what is undertaken. 
Purpose 
Case histories describing downtown redevelopments are rare. Those few which 
do exist are not written from a planner's perspective. A case history written 
from that perspective would be a valuable addition to the references available 
to other communities. This report will be one such report. 
The City of Manhattan, Kansas, through a series of events and decisions, con- 
cluded that a redevelopment of its downtown area was necessary. The purpose 
was twofold. First, the economic viability of the business core in the CBD, 
which had been declining for fifteen years, needed strengthening. Second, 
because of lack of maintenance, rehabilitation would be necessary for many of 
the old structures in the CBD. Redevelopment was believed necessary to pro- 
tect the area from further decline and to assure structural improvements. The 
project came about as a result of a coalition of efforts between local busi- 
ness organizations, local civic and community organizations, Kansas State Uni- 
versity resources, and the City of Manhattan. 
Although information is available from a number of sources regarding Manhattan's 
Downtown Redevelopment Project, no single source exists which clearly, con- 
cisely and completely reviews and explains the planning process used. This 
report will provide that source. This will be the case history of Manhattan's 
Downtown Redevelopment Project from 1971, when the first of several rezoning 
requests which sparked the City into action was made, to 1982, when a decision 
will be made regarding the City's application for Urban Development Action 
Grant funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Review of the Literature 
A review of the literature available regarding downtown redevelopment efforts 
reveals writings diverse in purpose, scope, and emphasis. It also reveals 
what types of studies or approaches are lacking and which would be useful, 
helpful, or informative. Additional diversity offers perspectives which can 
be used in making future decisions. The types of studies and other writings 
now used in relation to downtown redevelopment will be reviewed in this sec- 
tion. The general description and examples of each will be given. After 
this review is completed, a brief analytical discussion will follow. This 
will describe the types of information available and that which is lacking 
in the current literature. 
There are five categories of literature presently available which, either di- 
rectly or indirectly, describe the planning process used in the redevelopment 
of central business districts. These are: 
* handbooks and manuals; 
* technical reports; 
* issue-specific reports; 
* articles in lay publications; and 
* case histories. 
Several handbooks or "how-to-do-it" manuals available describe the planning 
process which, if followed, should add in creating a viable downtown redevel- 
opment project. One example of such a publication is the Downtown Redevelop- 
ment Handbook. This volume is one of a Community Builders Handbook series pub- 
lished by the Urban Land Institute (ULI). It "sets forth the steps both pri- 
vate and public sectors should undertake for the successful revitalization of 
a new development project in the central business district (CBD)." (ULI, p.1) 
Another example is the Downtown Improvement Manual written by Emanuel Bech 
and published by the American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO). The 
author had two objectives: to gain a state and national perspective on CBD 
improvement techniques and resources, and to produce a handbook which could be 
used in planning and implementing CBD improvements. Each of these handbooks 
provides step-by-step planning procedures, design standards, design and imple- 
mentation alternatives, financing methods, cost considerations, and factors 
which should be considered when determining the appropriateness of a plan to 
a particular situation. 
A second type of literature is technical reporting. This would include govern- 
mental reviews of the various federally funded projects. It also includes 
periodic summaries of redevelopment activities such as Downtown Planning and 
Development Annual or Downtown Idea Exchange, both by the Downtown Research 
and Development Center. One book which can be included in this category is 
Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal by Leo Adde. This serves as a 
source of the technical information which is necessary in planning a downtown 
redevelopment project. All of these resources offer standards and criteria. 
They analyze factors that determine feasibility, size, location and costs 
which would be involved in such a project. These are, most generally, physi- 
cal and design standards and criteria. They review specific projects, but 
only superficially in a few paragraphs and only from a technical perspective, 
reviewing, for example, location, size, necessary budget, and sources of funds. 
A third type of publication is that which addresses specific issues considered 
in a revitalization of a city's CBD. These are more specialized than the 
types of literature discussed previously and they may or may not be written 
primarily for use by planners or for downtown redevelopment projects. The 
information in them must be interpreted, modified and adapted to the specific 
project being planned. Because of the specificity of their nature, they 
usually address only one aspect of the redevelopment planning process. Cen- 
tral City Malls by Harvey M. Rubenstein is one such book. It addresses the 
special standards, criteria, and considerations vital to planners and de- 
signers for proper development of a specific redevelopment approach. 
Another example is American Urban Malls: A Compendium produced jointly by 
Columbia University Center for Advanced Research in Urban and Environmental 
Affairs and the Institute of Environmental Action. Although intended to ex- 
plore innovative planning, design and implementation urban projects, these 
objectives are third in the sponsors' objectives after 1) increasing public 
awareness of urban culture and ecology and 2) promoting public participation 
in decisions regarding the environmental quality of the public domain. It, 
like Rubenstein's book, is concerned with standards and criteria. Other liter- 
ary resources in this category would include those which address structural 
rehabilitation, feasibility study methodology, transportation and circulation 
guidelines, or cultural facilities planning. 
Less formal review of downtown redevelopment projects can be found in litera- 
ture more likely to be read by the general public. These usually provide a 
very general, superficial review of the state-of-the-art at the time of their 
writing. They may touch on the process, problems, or considerations, but not 
in detail. One example of this type of publication is the article, 'Shopping 
Mall Tycoons Invade New Territory' which appeared in "The Pierce Column" of 
the Washington Post on June 19, 1978. In ten column-inches it summarized the 
dangers of suburban development to CBD's, offering both public and private 
points of view. Another example is seen in the article, "How to Build a 
Shopping Mall...And How Not To" in the December, 1980, Kansas City Magazine. 
In lay language, it reviewed design aspects of several malls and what consti- 
tuted good and bad design decisions. 
Finally, a fifth form used to describe urban redevelopment is the case his- 
tory. These have most often been written by participant-observers. They have 
also most often been written by non-planners. They report the important events 
and decisions in a particular project, describe the persons most important in 
the project, and analyze and editorialize as to the problems, priorities and 
appropriateness of several aspects of the process. One such case history is 
Graham Frasier's Fighting Back. Using his professional skills as a newspaper 
reporter, he presented a review of an urban renewal project in Treffan Court, 
Toronto. It was intended "to give a clear picture about how community organiz- 
ing is done and not done." (Frasier, p. xiv) Another is The Politics of 
City Revenue by A. Meltsner. Written by an economist, it describes the pro- 
cess and politics of Oakland, California's, city budgetary system. However, 
the study which is considered a milestone in this style is Robert Dahl's Who 
Governs. Dahl's study used predominantly indirect observation techniques to 
answer the question, "In a political system where nearly every adult may vote 
but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and other 
resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?" (Dahl, p.1) As 
a case study, he chose the city of New Haven, Connecticut. It was written by 
a Yale University professor to test concepts, theories, and methods of behav- 
ioral science and politics.. A fourth example is the noted Power and Poverty: 
Theory and Practice by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. This study, also 
using indirect observation techniques, analyzed "how power, authority, and 
influence were brought to bear in two contrasting periods in shaping and sus- 
taining political beliefs, institutions, and procedures which, in turn, affect 
the distribution of outcomes among persons and groups in Baltimore." (Backrach 
and Baratz, p.103) 
Literature Summary 
Each of these forms of literary style has its benefits. Each has its weakness- 
es. Handbooks and manuals are useful in any set of circumstances, but are not 
useful in answering a specific question in a specific situation. Technical re- 
ports are not easily understood by those outside of a given specialization; 
lay publications are. However, inadequate technical information is gathered 
from lay articles and cannot be useful to the community planner. Issue-specific 
literature describes in detail one factor, but does not explain how all specific 
factors are integrated into one project. 
Case histories describe how a community integrated all of the factors and the 
successes and failures of the attempt, but duplication in another community may 
not be feasible for any number of reasons. One shortcoming in the library of 
literature available on the subject, however, is the lack of case histories 
written from a planning perspective. Planners describe the process in all 
other categories of literary style, but their perspective regarding an actual 
project, integrating all of the social, economic and political aspects as a 
case history, is virtually nonexistant. Because this is the prospective most 
needed by communities attempting a redevelopment project, the provision of such 
a volume would be most welcome. 
The advantages of this work would be several. First, it would give an actual 
account of a process which is being entered into more now than in the past. 
It would describe how various factors were weighed and integrated in a specific 
situation. Second, in this case, it would provide the first written source of 
information regarding the entire redevelopment process in Manhattan, Kansas. 
Finally, it would provide an education resource which is sorely needed. Works 
comparing and contrasting academically expressed processes with those which 
result in reality would serve students, instructors, and practitioners well. 
This need was expressed and described by H. Hightower in his address to the 
1976 AIP National Conference, "The Need for Case Studies in Planning Education." 
Scope and Method 
This case history of Manhattan's Downtown Redevelopment will be broad in scope 
chronologically, technically, and analytically. Chronologically, this paper 
will examine the events of the redevelopment process from 1971 up to 1982. 
The year 1971 was chosen because, as will be shown, several rezoning requests, 
beginning at that time, created the atmosphere and momentum which have main- 
tained the redevelopment plan, process, and proponents from then until now. 
Technically, the report will first review the rezoning requests and how they 
sparked action for redevelopment. Second will be an examination of the key ac- 
tors in the process. These will include citizens groups, City staff members, 
various governing bodies, and other individuals who, in one way or another, 
made their influence felt. Third, the actual redevelopment process will be de- 
scribed chronologically. How and why various factors grew or diminished in im- 
portance will be examined and strengths and weaknesses of the process will be 
described. 
Analytically, because the process has taken only three years from the completion 
of the Feasibility Study to the present, it will be possible to examine a varie- 
ty of factors and perspectives. The span of time has not been so great as to 
render specific issues so complex to be unwieldy to describe. Nor has it been 
so long as to fade memories or to see a great deal of change in persons in- 
volved. Most of those now working with the project have been with it since it 
began. Resources are diverse, complete, and accessible without being volumi- 
nous. The role of public information, the organization and effects of opposi- 
tion, and the problems and prizes of a public-private development venture will 
be described and examined. Interrelationships between community activities and 
the redevelopment process will be described. 
Methodologically, this report will be written from the perspective of a partici- 
pant observer. Considering the complexity of the issues which will be addressed, 
this would be a particularly useful approach for examining the planning process 
and for gaining insight into the significance of events. 
The participant worked as a Planning Intern and was an employee in Manhattan's 
Community Development Department for two years. She worked on the project di- 
rectly in several technical aspects during that time, between 1979 and 1981. 
"In participant observation, the investigator assumes 
a role within the group or community he or she seeks 
to study. It is through his or her participation... 
that the investigator collects data and gains insight 
into community structure and process... Furthermore, 
the participant observer uses a variety of specific 
techniques to collect data. These include direc ob- 
servation, interviewing, and the analysis of documents." 
(Poplin, p.292) 
It is an analytic description of a complex organization and: 
1. employs concepts, propositions and emperical generalizations 
of a body of scientific theory as the basic guides in analy- 
sis and reporting; 
2. employs thorough and systematic collection, classification 
and reporting of facts; and 
3. generates new empirical generalizations (and perhaps con- 
cepts and propositions as well) based on these data. 
There are three formats which participant observer studies. They are as fol- 
lows: 
* case histories; 
* analysis of distribution and frequency of events; and 
* review of generally known rules and statutes. 
This report will be presented as a case history of the events which collective- 
ly created the Downtown Redevelopment Project in Manhattan. 
In addition, there are four methods of data collection which can be employed 
in participant obeservation. These are: 
* direct observation; 
* indirect observation (minutes, articles, records, files); 
* interviews; and 
* direct participation. 
All of these methods will be used to some extent in collecting data for this 
report. Having worked on several aspects of the project directly, having been 
in a position for two years which has allowed for direct observation and inter- 
viewing, and having access to all indirect observation resources will facilitate 
the data collection process. 
The major drawback of the participant-observer method is the possibility of bias 
in the reporting. This potential problem will be addressed in several ways in 
this report. First, the role of the observer in this case, while directly in- 
volved with the project in several technical respects, was distant enough to 
offer close observation without requiring professional or personal commitment. 
Second, a constant, conscience effort on the part of the observer will be main- 
tained to assure objectivity. 
The Product 
The data collected and generated will be integrated into a written report. It 
will be a narrative case history of the Downtown Redevelopment Project in 
Manhattan, Kansas, written from the Planning perspective of a participant ob- 
server. 
After a review of the events leading to the start of the process and a brief 
look at some of the key actors involved in the process, the process and project 
will be described in detail. Finally, an analysis of various aspects of the 
project will be presented. 
The report is meant to serve several functions. First, it is meant to serve as 
a source of information regarding Manhattan's Downtown Redevelopment Project. 
Second, it should serve as a resource for planners in other communities consid- 
ering a similar project. Finally, it would be a very valuable tool and resource 
for use in planning education. 
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CHAPTER II 
SETTING THE STAGE 
Introduction 
"Looking to the future, Manhattan can at least hold 
its present share of trade area purchasing power... 
However,...it is quite possible that Manhattan can 
increase its 'capture' so that the outlook for 
Manhattan GAF sales is for growth due to: 1) a 
bigger Trade Area (due to population and income 
growth), and 2) a greater 'capture' of the trade 
area purchasing power total -- a greater share of 
the total area 'pie.'" 
(1968 Land Use Plan, p.45) 
The 1968 Oblinger and Smith Economic Base and Population Study/Forecast stated 
that "by 1985 Manhattan should plan to attract and accommodate up to 200,000 
gross square feet of new store space of a 'region serving' or 'shoppers' goods' 
character (General Merchandise, Apparel, and Furniture -- GAF stores)." The 
plan continued to say that "most of this potential GAF store space...should be 
located downtown" and that "such space would likely generate support for other 
store types." (Ibid, p.41) 
In addition, the Neighborhood Analysis of the same Land Use Plan found "that 
the Central Business District of Manhattan is suffering seriously from blight 
and deterioration and demands drastic remedial treatment if it is to maintain 
its position as a regional shopping center..." "It is basically a treatment 
of the rehabilitation and redevelopment to provide for new parking, new public 
uses, new commercial areas(s), and to rid the city of the deterioration and 
dilapidation which is now present." (Ibid, p.56) The City had adopted the 
Oblinger and Smith studies as official statements of policy. Based on these 
concepts described in the plans, proposals for regional retail developments 
which would have been outside of the CBD were discouraged and denied. Nothing, 
however, was done to implement the plans until 1977. This chapter will describe 
the situations which led to the eventual birth of the Downtown Redevelopment 
Project in Manhattan. 
Landmark Shopping Center 
The first large-scale development proposal after the adoption of the 1968 Land 
Use Plan was presented informally to Manhattan's Planning Board in January of 
1971. A Topeka developer requested that he be allowed to construct a shopping 
center on the "John's Tract" (See Plate 1), twenty-two acres of agricultural 
land in the southwest corner of the city. The formal request for rezoning the 
property from R - Single Family Residential District to PDD - Planned Develop- 
ment District was made at the April meeting and the public hearing was set for 
the May meeting. 
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PLATE 1 
THE JOHN'S TRACT 
At the May public hearing, the project was described in detail. It was to be 
a shopping center of 228,334 square feet of leasable retail space, including 
two major department stores, a supermarket, an auto center and service station 
and numerous small shops. 
Those persons speaking in favor of the proposal were: John Haley, The Topeka 
Developer; B.J. Kingdon, the project architect; and Richard Seaton, a Manhattan 
attorney representing the developer. Statements made in favor of the proposal 
were: 
1) that the development would add 3.5 million dollars 
to the local tax base; 
2) that a market study had indicated that there was 
market potential for the center; 
3) that potential tenants had agreed with the market 
study conclusions; and 
4) that the presentation and project were in compliance 
with the Zoning Ordinance requirements for PDD's and 
rezoning requests. 
Only one person, Dr. Stigge, a member of the Planning Board, spoke in opposition. 
His points were: 
1) that for three years the City had been trying to 
maintain a strong downtown; 
2) that the development would create a traffic problem; 
3) that shopping centers have a different tax structure 
than the downtown; and 
4) that not enough time had been given the new Urban 
Renewal Agency to operate. 
A motion to recommend that the City Commission approve the request was passed 
by a vote of five in favor and two opposed. 
When the issue came before the City Commission, however, it was remanded back to 
the Planning Board. There had been several protest petitions filed with the 
City Clerk in opposition to the proposal. Several public meetings held to re- 
view public opinion had revealed strong opposition. In addition, several docu- 
ments had been presented at those meetings which had not been made available 
at the Planning Board meetings. Because the size of the proposed project was 
approximately half the size of the downtown retail area, the Commission felt 
that "its large size warrant(ed) careful review of its possible economic im- 
pact on the total community." (City Commission minutes, July 6, 1971) 
In July, the Planning Board reconsidered the rezoning request. Ray Weisenburger, 
a professor of Regional and Community Planning at Kansas State University, as- 
sumed the role of planning consultant for the Board as the City had no profes- 
sional planner on staff. He reviewed the City's Land Use Plan and The Economic 
Studies for General Planning prepared for the City in 1967 by Robert Gladstone 
and Associates. The results of the Gladstone report were reviewed and reaf- 
firmed in 1971 by Dr. Darwin W. Daicoff of the University of Kansas in his re- 
port, "An Economic Evaluation of the Request for Rezoning the 'Johns' Property 
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to Allow the Construction of the Landmark Mall Regional Shopping Center in 
Manhattan, Kansas." Briefly, those studies concluded that the construction of 
a large-scale retail shopping area outside of the downtown would have an ex- 
treme and detrimental impact on the City's economy. In the case of downtown 
businesses, the studies pointed out that it was "one thing to fear competition 
but quite another to fear disaster." There was good reason to fear such a 
disaster in this case. For the City as a whole, a mall would indeed mean in- 
creased revenues from sales and taxes. However, the benefits derived would 
have to be weighed in light of the costs which would result from the inevitable 
decline in sales and tax revenues from a deteriorating CBD. Weisenburger's com- 
ments were: 
* the proposed commercial area equalled the entire 
amount proposed to be added to the downtown area 
by 1985; 
* the Land Use Plan should not be revised because 
there had been no major changes in the city or in 
policy since its adoption; 
* the shopping center was premature; 
* the downtown area would suffer economic losses if 
it were permitted to be constructed. 
On the basis of these facts and his analysis, he recommended denial of the re- 
quest as it would not be "good planning." 
There were several other speakers in opposition to the request. Their concerns 
were based on increased traffic generation; incompatibility of the development 
with surrounding property and property values; and detrimental impact on the 
community's economy. 
Based on the information received at that meeting, the Board reversed its pre- 
vious recommendation and recommended that the City Commission deny this rezoning 
request by a vote of six in favor and two opposed. 
At its July 20, 1971, meeting, the Commission, "to the hearty applause of 
nearly 80 Landmark opponents in an audience of nearly 100 persons," voted to 
deny this request with a vote of three in favor of denial and two opposed. 
(Manhattan Mercury, July 21, 1971) It had not been a simple issue or easy de- 
cision for the Commission. According to Commissioner Hanks, "This will be one 
of the more important decisions that will have a long lasting effect. Your 
(Landmark's) consultant has done a wonderful job of making it difficult." Com- 
missioner Reitz expressed the majority philosophy by saying, "We need to con- 
sider how to develop the east part of Manhattan. Urban renewal might lead to 
development in the future, that would be more valuable than southwest develop- 
ment at the periphery of town. I don't believe this (Landmark) is in the best 
interest of the community." The reasons for denial were given as follows: 
* the need for the development was questioned; 
* the development'of west Manhattan must be considered; 
* before a decision could be made, it would be necessary 
for the City to consult with impartial, objective plan- 
ning consultants; and 
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* the request did not represent good planning or 
serve the best interest and economic welfare of 
the entire community. 
The Village Green 
Late in 1972, the same developer requested the same rezoning for the same 
piece of property as the Landmark Center. The proposed development was similar 
to the Landmark Center, but addressed some of the concerns expressed during the 
earlier public hearings. Some of the modifications made were: 
* traffic control would limit the location of curb 
cuts; 
* better screening for parking and service areas; 
* architectural differences and differences in build- 
ing materials; and 
* conversion of the service station into a small shop- 
ping plaza. 
The center was expected to have a trade area of seven or eight counties. 
The public hearing to consider this request was held over a three month period 
from September to November, 1972. Mr. Haley again spoke in favor of the project. 
He "cited the opposition to the center as based 99% by virtue of fear of compe- 
tition: Westloop and Downtown businesses have opposed this center." (Planning 
Board minutes, September 18, 1972) Most of the other proponents were women who 
said they shopped out of town and would prefer to shop in Manhattan. 
Opponents included Dan Meyers, a. Manhattan attorney, who said the request was 
not in compliance with the Land Use Plan. Ray Weisenburger reenforced that 
statement as well as stressing the recommendations of the Gladstone Report and 
noting environmental concerns. A petition, signed by 138 persons in opposition 
to the request, was presented. Eight residents spoke in opposition as did a 
representative of the Environmental Board. At the end of the hearing on November 
13, 1972, a motion to recommend denial of the rezoning failed by a four to four 
vote. Thus, the Planning Board did not give a majority vote recommendation for 
either approval or denial of this request. In such a case, Kansas State statute 
allows that "the Governing Body may take such action as it deems appropriate." 
(KSA 12-708) 
At the December 5th City Commission meeting, John Haley was the only proponent 
who spoke. Dan Meyers, Ray Weisenburger and four other residents spoke in oppo- 
sition. Mr. Meyers included in his remarks the statement that the development 
would not be a neighborhood shopping center, as stated by the developer, but 
rather would be a regional shopping center. When the Commission asked the pre- 
dominately opposed audience if the opposition was for all such centers or only 
this particular project, the indication was overwhelmingly that the latter was 
the case. 
A motion to deny the rezoning request was passed four in favor to zero opposed. 
One Commissioner abstained saying he felt that there were still too many un- 
answered questions. Also, he would have preferred a vote of record from the 
Planning Board. 
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PLATE 2 
MANHATTAN's POTENTIAL DEVWLOPMENT SITES 
It was not until 1976 that the questions about regional retail development 
in Manhattan were raised again. 
Westloop Shopping Center 
In 1976, Security Benefit Life Corporation, an insurance and investment company, 
made several requests of the City in an attempt to expand development in the 
Westloop Shopping Center (See Plate 2). SBL wanted to upgrade the facades in 
the center and to construct additional retail space. It first applied for an 
amendment to the text of the Zoning Ordinance. The company wanted to construct 
a 60,000 square foot retail shop in a C-2 Neighborhood Shopping District. Ac- 
cording to the 1976 Manhattan Zoning Ordinance, a Neighborhood Shopping District 
was "designed to permit areas of convenience shopping facilities so located to 
serve one or more residential neighborhoods" and had a use limitation 25,000 
square feet for each separate business establishment. SBL wanted that use limi- 
tation deleted. By eliminating this requirement, regional-size department 
stores would have been allowed in Westloop as well as in other C-2 districts. 
The Planning Board had recommended to the City Commission that the change be 
made. The Commission, however, did not approve it and it was returned to the 
Planning Board for reconsideration for three reasons: 
1) "this request is not in keeping with the 1969 
Oblinger Smith Land Use Plan, either in principle 
or in particulars, and this does ligitimately take 
into consideration a strong Central Business District; 
2) the request does not appear to be conducive to orderly 
growth. Specific concerns are parking and traffic; 
and 
3) the need for such a change has not been clearly demon- 
strated by the petitioners." 
(Planning Board Minutes, 1/12/76) 
In addition to comments made which were similar to those made in 1971 and 1972 
John's Tract request, Bernd Foerster, Dean of Kansas State University's-College 
of Architecture and Design, offered some design considerations which should be 
included in the decision-making process. "Our downtown area has what others 
lack - a concentration of pedestrians. The other shopping centers are not pedes- 
trian oriented." 
Upon reconsideration, the Planning Board decided to recommend denial of the 
text change request by a vote of five in favor, three opposed, and 1 abstention. 
The public hearing was held before the Planning Board on April 12, 1976. Dick 
Green, a Manhattan attorney representing SBL, indicated that "the main thrust 
of the application (was) the upgrading and integration of the entire center, 
including a building larger than 25,000 square feet." (Planning Board minutes, 
April 12, 1976) Statements made in favor of the rezoning addressed renovations 
and the center's appearance, construction of a 60,000 square foot building and 
one of 2,800 square feet, internal circulation and traffic impacts outside the 
center. Justification for construction of a 60,000 square foot building under 
POD when it was not allowable under C-2 was that "this is not new space; just 
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concentrated in one place. The economic impact of three times 20,000 square 
feet is probably not significant." (Planning Board minutes, April 12, 2976) 
Statements made in opposition were concerned with decrease in CBD tax base and 
lower return from outlying business; questions regarding the need for a 60,000 
square foot building in that plaza; traffic generation; the probability of a 
"domino effect" if a major downtown retailer moves to Westloop; the Land Use 
Plan; the Zoning Ordinance; land development and management; and long and short- 
term effects of the growth of the entire city. There was also an indication 
that the recently formed Redevelopment Committee had begun efforts to implement 
the Land Use Plan. 
A motion to recommend approval of the rezoning with two stipulations was made. 
The stipulations were: 
1) that the traffic on Anderson, Claflin and Seth Childs 
be studied and an equitable cost distribution be deter- 
mined; and 
2) that no building in the center exceed 25,000 square 
feet of floor area. 
The motion failed to pass by a vote of one in favor, three opposed, and two 
abstentions. A motion to recommend approval of the request with no stipulations 
was passed by a vote of four in favor, one opposed, and one abstention. 
Before the request was seen by the City Commission, however, SBL had made some 
changes in the proposed traffic plan to reflect the desires of some tenants. 
The changes had been significant enough in the opinion of the City Attorney 
that he recommended the new plan be reviewed by the Planning Board before being 
reviewed by the City Commission. In other words, because of the changes, it was 
to be reviewed as if it were a new request. 
This was heard again by the Planning Board at its June 14, 1976, meeting. Board 
member Wilson stepped down during this discussion as he was one of the original 
incorporators of Westloop and was, at the time, involved in a contract arrange- 
ment for purchase of the site with SBL. 
The speakers and comments in favor of the rezoning were the same as those at 
the April hearing. 
There were more speakers in opposition at this hearing than at the previous hear- 
ing. The issues discussed in opposition were: 
* conflict with the Land Use Plan; 
* the fact that the Design Studio, a Manhattan Archi- 
tectural firm, had begun a study for the redevelopment 
of the downtown; 
* findings of the Environmental Board and its recommen- 
dation to deny the request; 
* concerns of the senior citizens and others who were 
dependent on the CBD and lacked mobility to access 
an outlying location; and 
* traffic circulation. 
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Comments were more detailed, organized, and succinct than they had been in 
April. Assertiveness on the part of the opponents was in evidence, also. For 
example, Mr. Green had said that: 
* the issue was the degree that the community wished 
to go in subsidizing or protecting the CBD; 
* assisting the CBD to remain strong was agreeable, 
but it should not be done in a manner that restricts 
competition by other commercial interests; 
* by denying this rezoning request, the Board was, in 
effect, restricting competition. 
Mr. Crocker countered that "the PDD zoning classification was designed to pro- 
vide control over the development of a site and that a developer should expect 
limitations and restrictions when requesting PDD zoning. Further, the Planning 
Board represents the community and should ask a developer to show or justify 
that a change will be in the best interest of the community." (Planning Board 
minutes, June 14, 1976) 
In another comment, "Green. sited a 1955 Pennsylvania Appellate Court decision 
which stated that the purpose of zoning 'is not to limit or restrict competi- 
tion.'" (Ibid) He stressed his feeling that negative attitudes toward the re- 
quest were based on fear of competition in the market place. Richard Burke, 
President of Downtown, Incorporated, which is an association of downtown busi- 
nessmen and whose purpose is to plan and coordinate promotional activities in 
the business community such as sidewalk sales, "commended SBL on the exterior 
improvements, but said that the real issue was not traffic or upgrading, but 
the building of the 60,000 square foot building." (Ibid) 
This was the first time that an opponent had directly countered a statement 
made by a proponent in the entire history of the issue in Manhattan. Until 
this meeting, all indications are that each side would present its facts, fig- 
ures and feelings without directly countering the other. It had been up to 
the Board members and Commissioners to sort out the accuracy and appropriate- 
ness of the information given. 
The Planning Board Chairman, Bob L. Smith, made three comments: 
1) the proposed plan was not in conformance with the 
adopted Land Use Plan; 
2) the elderly persons in and around the CBD should 
be considered; and 
3) the proposed plans were good, but the Board must 
consider the impact on the entire community. 
A motion to recommend denial of the rezoning request failed to carry with a 
two to two vote. Chairman Smith "invited Green 'to go to the courts and find 
out if this (denial) is indeed a restraint of trade.'" (Ibid) The request 
went to the City Commission without a Planning Board recommendation. 
The request came before the City Commission on August 3, 1976. The only new 
piece of information given by the developers was that Sears would consider going 
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into Westloop, but only if a building plan were provided. The building plan 
could be provided only after approval of this rezoning request by the Commis- 
sion. 
Only three persons spoke to the issue. Two were in favor: Charles Green, SBL's 
attorney; and Bob Plymate, an SBL representative. The person who spoke in op- 
position was Bernd Foerster, Dean of the Kansas State University College of 
Architecture and Design. 
There were several factors taken into account by the Commission. These were 
that: 
* the Planning Board had not recommended approval; 
* several commissioners wanted more information re- 
garding zoning compliance and plan details; 
* the request was not considered to be in the best 
interest of Manhattan as a whole; 
* the burden of proof of a need for such a change 
was the developer's responsibility; and 
* the request was not in compliance with the Land 
Use Plan nor with the policy to "maintain a strong 
CBD." 
However, the August 4 Manhattan Mercury reported that, "What seemed to clinch 
the negative vote was a statement-from SBL vice-president Bob Plymate that he 
had contacted Sears headquarters in Dallas, who had indicated interest in relo- 
downtown store in Westloop. apparently proved true 
the fears by downtown businessmen that the Westloop development would lure away 
one or more of the major chains from the Central Business District." 
On motion, the request was denied by a vote of four to one. The reasons for 
disapproval were given as follows: 
1) noncompliance with the Land Use Plan; 
2) the burden of proof of need is on the developer; 
3) if neighborhood shopping facilities were "permitted 
to expand and provide the same scope of commercial 
activities as provided in the Central Business District, 
this would tend to promote vacancies in the downtown 
area and increase, in some instances, the blighting 
process in the downtown area. The following reasons 
were offered for retaining the downtown area as the 
most prominent shopping area in the city: 
* property values are the highest in this area and 
present a formidable tax base in the community. 
In short, land values are high, thus the highest 
and best use of the land is for concentrated re- 
tail shopping goods outlet development. 
* the downtown area contains a considerable invest- 
ment in public monies as related to streets, sewers, 
water mains and all the improvements which are pre- 
sently located in this area. If another regional 
center is permitted to locate at the outskirts of 
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present development, the new center must be 
provided with additional utilities and improve- 
ments which would tend to cost more than just 
permitting a neighborhood shopping center to 
develop. 
* In or very near the downtown area is a consider- 
able investment in public buildings. Particular 
attention should be focused to the fact that a 
new library structure will be constructed near 
the downtown area in the near future. It has been 
proven that in order for a public library to ef- 
fectively operate, it must be near a major re- 
tailing center in a community due to the fact 
that library patrons usually combine library 
trips with shopping trips. In other words, if 
the downtown area ceases more and more to exist 
as a shopping center, the library may be used to 
a lesser degree than if the downtown area was re- 
tained as the major retail shopping center." 
(Land Use Plan, p.52) 
4) rezoning would not be in the best interest of the city; 
and 
5) "there has been a failure to present to this body on an 
issue of this magnitude and importance the necessary 
materials for me to make a fair and equitable decision 
and this would be the first time in all the time I have 
been here that I have known that so little has been 
presented for us to make a decision on." (Hanks) 
The John's Tract 
Fourteen months later a similar proposal was brought before the City governing 
body. This was a request for rezoning the John's Tract from R-1 Single-Family 
Residential District to POD. This wos the same property that had been subject 
to similar requests in 1971 and 1972. 
The proposal was to build a regional shopping center. The center would include 
a 96,400 square foot mall, anchored by two major stores, peripheral developments 
and associated parking. The public hearing was heard by the Planning Board on 
December 19, 1977. 
In his written staff report, Gary Stith, Manhattan's Chief Planner, stressed 
that there were two major issues to be considered in this proposal. 
"The first is to consider the merits of the Land Use issue, 
i.e., should a regional shopping center be located on this 
site? This is a policy issue and if the answer is negative, 
the second issue is a moot question. The second issue in- 
volves the Site Design of the proposed preliminary develop- 
ment plan of this PDD." 
(Staff Report, December 16, 1977) 
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The staff reviewed the positive and negative impacts of various aspects of the 
proposal. Those aspects were economic, physical, environmental and social con- 
siderations regarding the specific site design such as internal circulation, 
grading, landscaping, and signage. 
Detailed input was presented from the Environmental Board, a city advisory 
board to the Commission. At its December 6, 1977, meeting, this item was re- 
viewed. In summary, its findings were that: 
* an alternative drainage system should be developed 
to reduce run-off: a retention pond was suggested; 
* more complete landscaping plan be developed to quad- 
ruple the number of trees and to address signage 
more specifically; 
* more information on traffic generation be provided: 
it was suggested that the developer, Gottlieb Corpor- 
ation, widen Seth Childs Road from two lanes to four 
lanes and that, in addition, a deceleration lane also 
be provided to address the concerns over the poten- 
tial problems of traffic bottlenecks; 
* more information regarding the economic impacts be 
provided: there was a concensus that the develop- 
ment would "not be good for the community as a whole" 
because of its effects on: 
-city costs of sprawl development; 
-effects on downtown; 
-effects on the community around the downtown; and 
-effects on housing around the downtown; 
and 
* more information regarding the effects on increased 
trade and increased sales be provided. 
The developer's engineer addressed several of these issues at that meeting- Ad- 
equate drainage was already provided under the highway to address run-off. Be- 
cause Seth Childs Road was under the jurisdiction of the Kansas Department of 
Transportation (KDOT), no review of the preliminary plans or study of traffic 
could begin by KDOT until after a zoning decision had been made. 
Discussion at the public hearing before the Planning Board was much the same 
as that during the SBL request. While it recommended denial of the request, 
the Board did make it very clear that if no progress were made in the follow- 
ing year or two regarding downtown redevelopment, it would not be possible for 
the Board to continue such recommendations in the future. 
"Wohler stated that he, like most shoppers, would like 
to see a mall, but he thought that the downtown area 
appears to want to remain strong. He further stated, 
though, that if no progress were made, he would have 
to reconsider his vote in the future." 
"Elsea stated that the Redevelopment Committee is making 
forward progress. However, unless improvement is made, 
support on Elsea's part cannot continue." 
(Planning Board minutes, December 19, 1977) 
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By the time the City Commission made its decision on March 21, 1978, it had 
become known publically that Sears and Penneys, the two major downtown stores, 
would relocate into this mall, should it be approved. Neither store, however, 
had representatives present at the meetings. This was the case even though 
the issue was postponed once to allow a Sears representative to be available. 
There were seventeen speakers in opposition to the request. Their comments 
focused on four points: 
* the community could not support both the mall and 
the downtown as major retail cores; 
* efforts toward downtown redevelopment had begun 
and would be crippled should the rezoning be ap- 
proved; 
* rezoning the property as requested was not in 
compliance with the 1968 Land Use Plan. That 
Plan indicated the site would be most suitable 
for a neighborhood shopping district, not a re- 
gional shopping area; and 
* the poor, elderly, and minorities were most de- 
pendent on a viable downtown for services, shop- 
ping and maintained property values. 
The fact that several similar requests, including the recent SBL request, had 
been denied was cited as precedent and the reason for such denials was meant 
to protect the citizen "who picks up the tab." The motion to deny the request. 
for rezoning passed by a vote of four to zero to one. 
The Result 
The motivation to prepare a downtown redevelopment process and project resulted 
from these land use decisions. The governing bodies had made it very clear to 
the City staff and downtown interests that unless substantial progress were 
made toward such a project within a reasonable amount of time, the inactivity 
would be interpreted as the infeasibility of preserving the downtown area as 
the regional shopping area and other policies would be implemented. The fol- 
lowing chapters describe the course of action taken. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MANHATTAN, KANSAS - 
THE PLACE AND THE PEOPLE 
Introduction 
"As they worked together, not always in harmony, 
these common goals and mutual business affairs 
drew them closer together in their determination 
to build a good town." 
(Riley County, Kansas, Winifred Slagg) 
The redevelopment of downtown Manhattan has still to be implemented. The pre- 
cise extent and shape that it will take remains to be seen. However, the de- 
velopment of the present plan and package was possible only through a variety 
of community groups and individuals who, for the most part, volunteered time, 
effort, and expertise to create a viable, comprehensive and rational course of 
action, just as city founders had, as described above. 
This chapter will describe Manhattan and the groups and persons who actively 
helped to formulate the Redevelopment Project. The location, physical charac- 
teristics and history of the city will be described. The demographic and 
will also be discussed. The description of the City 
will be followed by a brief examination of the organizations which played 
some part in creating the Redevelopment Plan. Their purpose and role will 
be outlined. Finally, the persons who contributed on an individual basis will 
be introduced. 
The City of Manhattan 
Physical Profile 
Manhattan, located in northeastern Kansas, is the County Seat of Riley County. 
(See Plate 3) It is at the junction of the Big Blue River and the Kansas (KAW) 
River. In general, the area is characterized by low, flat hills of the Flint 
Hills which run from Nebraska through Kansas into Oklahoma. The area's predom- 
inant landscape features, typical to prairie lands, are the tall Bluestem 
grass and the limestone outcroppings of the Flint Hills. Topographically, 
Manhattan ranges from 1,000 feet above sea level in the northwestern portion. 
Manhattan is within the Humid Continental Climate Zone. The average annual 
temperature is 55°F and ranges from a January average of 18.5°F to a July aver- 
age of 93°F. The humid climate coupled with the good agricultural soils created 
an attractive site for white settlers. 
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RILEY COUNTY, KANSAS 
City of Manhattan 
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Historical Profile 
Manhattan was settled before the Civil War, as was much of Kansas, not only for 
the purpose of taking advantage of free available land, but also for the politi- 
cal purpose of influencing the vote on the slavery issue. Anti-slavery organi- 
zations in the eastern states were alarmed by the pro-slavery influence of 
Missouri in the midwest. These organizations provided financial assistance and 
protection through Indian lands to encourage settlers with "good moral values" 
to move to Kansas. 
In 1855, the New England Emigrant Aid Society brought the first colony to Riley 
County. These settlers founded the Town of Poleska, located in the southwest 
part of the present city limits of Manhattan. Later in that same year, two 
other settlements were established. Canton was located at the mouth of the 
Blue River by the Canton Company and the Boston Company founded the community 
of Boston between Polaska and Canton. These three communities merged and the 
new town was named Boston. In June of 1855, a fourth group of settlers, bound 
for western Kansas, joined with the Boston community rather than continue their 
journey west. To comply with a condition of their New York investors, the name 
of the settlement was changed to Manhattan. The political incorporation was 
completed in 1857. 
The influences left by these original settlers is still in evidence today, 
both socially and physically. Socially, the effects of settlement are apparent 
in the conservative, religious, temporate attitude and values of the population. 
Physically, the effects are more obvious. For example, it was the original 
settlers who, when organizing their new town, decided to arrange the streets 
in a gridiron pattern. Another example was the decision to have side streets 
60 feet across in most instances and 100 feet across for every seventh street 
or avenue. These patterns remain today and effected several aspects of the 
downtown redevelopment process. 
Demographic Profile 
The City of Manhattan has, since 1950, experienced an increase in population. 
The rate of increase was approximately 20 percent per decade. The market area, 
which is considered to include Riley County and eleven neighboring counties, 
has also increased in population since 1950. The rate of growth in the market 
area was between 2 and 2.5 percent until 1970 after which the growth was esti- 
mated to be at a rate of 5.6 percent. (See Plate 4) 
The most heavily populated county within the market area is Riley County with 
an estimated 1977 population of 64,512. Of that number, 27,575, or 43 percent, 
live in Manhattan. In addition, approximately 8,433, or 12.5 percent, of the 
County's residents are military personnel associated with Fort Riley Army Base 
in adjacent Geary County and another 21 percent, or 5,786 persons, are students 
at Kansas State University and who live in the City. 
A variety of methods have been used in the past to estimate the population of 
Manhattan and its market area. All indicate a net increase in both. However, 
the most reliable assumes growth will continue at a decreasing rate. (Manhattan, 
1978) 
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In general, the median age characteristics of Manhattan's market area is in- 
creasing. This is probably due to two factors: 
1) the increased level of immigration of younger 
people from rural areas to urbanized and semi- 
urbanized areas; and 
2) the increased immigration of retirement-aged 
persons into the State of Kansas. 
The City of Manhattan and Riley County, however, have median ages lower than 
that of the market area and that trend is expected to continue because of the 
influence of Kansas State University students and Fort Riley personnel on the 
City's population. 
Economic Profile 
Because of the influences of Kansas State University and Fort Riley, the fact 
that Manhattan is the county seat, and the realities of maintaining its own 
city government, it is no surprise that 56 percent of the persons employed in 
Manhattan are involved with either Public Administration or Services. (See 
Plate 4) However, these are nonbasic economic activities. 
The outstanding basic activity is retailing. Eighteen percent of the employed 
population is involved with the retail industry. However, it has been known 
that, even though retailing commands an important position in the City's and 
area's economy, 
"retail sales per capita...are only slightly more than 
one-half of the state-wide average. This indicates 
that a large amount of retail spending by residents... 
takes place in other counties... These presently lost 
sales could provide an opportunity for the expansion 
of retail facilities in Manhattan." 
(Yes...Downtown Manhattan, p.IV-9) 
It is also believed that the per capita and household incomes of residents with- 
in the Manhattan market area will continue to increase as it has in the past. 
The average per capita income is lower in Riley County than almost all of the 
other counties in the market area. This is attributed to the effect of students 
at Kansas State University as well as the military personnel at Fort Riley on 
the economy. Even though this is the case, the data indicates growth in the 
income figures for Riley County which is equal to or greater than any of the 
other counties in the market area. This trend is also expected to continue. 
There are five major retailing areas in Manhattan. (See Plate 5) These are: 
* The Central Business District; 
* Aggieville; 
* Westloop Shopping Center; 
* Village Plaza Shopping Center; and 
* Walmart/K-Mart Shopping Centers. 
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TOTAL 
N % 
1950 
MALE 
N % 
FEMALE 
N % 
TOTAL 
N % 
1960 
MALE 
if % 
FEMALE 
N % 
TOTAL 
N % 
1970 
MALE 
N % 
FEMALE 
N % 
Agriculture 115 2.0 108 1.8 7 0.1 235 3.0 231 3.0 4 0.1 353 3.0 312 2.8 41 0.4 
Mining 14 .02 14 0.2 0 0 20 0.3 20 0.3 0 0 11 0.1 11 0.1 0 0 
Construction 412 7.0 402 6.7 10 0.2 563 7.0 555 7.1 8 0.1 629 6.0 624 5.6 5 0.1 
Manufacturing 241 4.0 188 3,1 53 0.9 334 4.0 258 3.3 76 1.0 487 4.0 354 3.2 133 1.2 
Transportation 307 5.0 237 4.0 70 1.2 289 4.0 242 3.1 47 .6 477 4.0 338 3.0 139 1.2 
ra 
Wholesale 233 4.0 176 2.9 57 1.0 224 3.0 211 2.7 13 .2 400 4.0 278 2.5 122 1.1 
V Retail 1043 17.0 822 13.7 521 8.7 1467 19.0 465 12.4 502 6.4 2025 18.0 1211 10.9 814 7.3 
Finance 293 5.0 166 2.8 127 2.1 462 6.0 285 3.7 177 2.3 546 5.0 331 3.0 215 1.9 
Services 2810 47.0 1506 25.1 1304 21.8 3694 47.0 1949 25.0 1745 22.4 5549 50.0 2849 25.6 270 24.3 
Pub. Adm. 526 9.0 368 6.1 158 2.6 510 7.0 355 4.6 155 2.0 644 6.0 441 4.0 203 1.8 
5994 3987 66.5 2307 33.5 7798 5071 65.0 2727 35.0 1 121 6749 60.7 4372 39.3 
SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS 
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In addition, the City of Topeka is believed to supplement the retailing needs 
of shoppers in the Manhattan market area. 
The CBD is zoned C-4 Central Business District. It is the only district in 
the city so zoned. It provides a total retail space inventory of 208,050 
square feet. A summary of that space is given in Plate 6. According to the 
Feasibility Study completed for the City, "(d)owntown Manhattan is presently 
not a particularly pleasant place for shoppers," nor does it "adequately ful- 
fill its role as the social and economic center of Manhattan." (Yes, p.IV-4) 
That same study did, however, note that the downtown continues to be consid- 
ered a focal point of the nonuniversity part of the community. It has a di- 
versity of uses...some key facilities and a concentration of retail shopping 
facilities." (Yes, p.IV-5) 
Aggieville is a C-3 General Business District. This is a district designed to 
provide a relatively broad range of retail shopping facilities. It consists 
primarily of specialty shops and activities which most directly serve the stu- 
dent population. The activities are predominately clothing stores, gift shops, 
books and stationery shops, movie theaters and eating and drinking establish- 
ments. (See Plate 7) 
Westloop Shopping Center, the Walmart/K-Mart Shopping Centers and Village Plaza 
Shopping Center are all Neighborhood Shopping Centers. They are designed to 
permit areas of convenience shopping facilities which are located to serve one 
or more residential neighborhoods. Each of these centers is anchored by a 
grocery store, and all, with the exception of Westloop, also contain a discount 
department store. In addition, there are several specialty shops associated 
with the centers. The data for each of these centers is summarized in Plates 
8 and 9. 
The Groups Involved 
Most citizen input related to the downtown redevelopment process was given as 
statements from various community organizations. Until late 1981, there was 
nothing which even resembled organized opposition to the project. Because of 
this fact and because the opposition organization which did emerge was not in 
direct opposition to the project and has had no direct effect on the process 
or project, the organization of those opposed to the project will be discussed 
in the Chapter 5 Analysis. This section will, however, give an overview of the 
several most important community organizations which supported the project. 
There were several groups of citizens which, since the beginning of the process, 
supported the downtown redevelopment effort. The Downtown Redevelopment Ad- 
visory Board (D.R.A.B.) offered aid and advise on a regular basis. Other 
groups were vocal in their support at public hearings or offered a nongovern- 
mental source of information regarding various aspects of the project. These 
were the Older Manhattan Neighborhood Association (OMNA) and the League of 
Women Voters. Finally, was the source of support in the form of technical 
assistance and professional expertise which was offered by the College of 
Architecture and Design at Kansas State University. 
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Total 
Retail Store Category Square Feet Square Feet 
General Merchandise 82,800 
Department Stores 56,050 
Other General Merchandise 26,750 
Apparel and Accessory 31,000 
Women's Apparel 17,700 
Men's Apparel 2,500 
Family Apparel 1,500 
Shoe Stores 6,150 
Other Apparel 3,150 
Furniture and Home Furnishings 17,500 
Hardware Stores 14,600 
Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores 33,150 
Sporting Goods 1,700 
Books and Stationery 9,400 
Camera, Photo Supplies 1,750 
Jewelry 8,800 
Gift Shops 5,500 
Other Miscellaneous Stores 6,000 
Movie Theaters 7,500 
Eating and Drinking 6,450 
Convenience Goods Stores 14,000 
Food 4,500 
Drug 8,700 
Other 800 
Miscellaneous Services 1,000 
Total Retail Space Inventory 208,050 
*For purposes of this table, the boundaries of downtown Manhattan's retail 
area were Humboldt Street on the north, Pierre Street on the south, Fifth 
Street on the west, and Second Street on the east. 
PLATE 6 
RETAIL SPACE DOWNTOWN MANHATTAN 
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Retail Store Category Square Feet 
General Merchandise 
Department Stores 
Other General Merchandise 
Apparel and Accessory 
Women's Apparel 8,800 
Men's Apparel 1,700 
Family Apparel 3,000 
Shoe Stores 900 
Total 
Square Feet 
14,400 
Furniture and Home Furnishings 6,900 
Hardware Stores 
Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores 
Sporting Goods 
Books and Stationery 
Camera, Photo Supplies 
Jewelry 
Gift Shops 
Other Miscellaneous Stores 
Movie Theaters 
Eating and Drinking 
Convenience Goods Stores 
Food 
Drug 
Other 
Miscellaneous Services 
Total Retail Space Inventory 
PLATE 7 
6,400 
9,700 
5,850 
1,050 
1,250 
RETAIL SPACE AGGIEVILLE AREA MANHATTAN 
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23,000 
5,000 
25,350 
1,250 
6,250 
82,150 
Total 
Retail Store Category Square Feet Square Feet 
General Merchandise 6,400 
Department Stores 
Other General Merchandise 6,400 
Apparel and Accessory 16,600 
Women's Apparel 
Men's Apparel 
Family Apparel 16,600 
Shoe Stores 
Other Apparel 
Furniture and Home Furnishings 32,600 
Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores 4,000 
Sporting Goods 
Books and Stationery 
Camera, Photo Supplies 1,200 
Jewelry 
Gift Shops 2,800 
Other Miscellaneous Stores 
Movie Theaters 9,700 
Eating and Drinking 14,250 
Convenience Goods Stores 27,200 
Food 21,600 
Drug 4,400 
Other 1,200 
Miscellaneous Services 24,300 
Total Retail Space Inventory 135,050 
PLATE 8 
RETAIL SPACE WESTLOOP SHOPPING CENTER 
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Retail Store Category Square Feet 
General Merchandise 
Department Stores 
Other General Merchandise 
Apparel and Accessory 
Women's Apparel 
Men's Apparel 
Family Apparel 
Shoe Stores 
Other Apparel 
130,000 
Total 
Square Feet 
130,000 
Furniture and Home Furnishings 5,000 
Hardware Stores 5,000 
Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores 
Sporting Goods 
Books and Stationery 
Camera, Photo Supplies 
Jewelry 
Gift Shops 
Other Miscellaneous Stores 
Movie Theaters 
Eating and Drinking 
2,500 
Convenience Goods Stores 
Food 
Drug 
Other 
Miscellaneous Services 
22,500 
2,200 
23,700 
Total Retail Space Inventory 161,200 
PLATE 9 
RETAIL SPACE WALMART/K-MART 
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The Downtown Redevelopment Advisory Board was established in November of 1979. 
This was merely a reorganization of the already existing Downtown Redevelop- 
ment Committee (DRC). The DRC had been created by the City Commission. In 
1979, after the Commission had selected a developer, it revised the purpose 
and responsibilities of the group and renamed it. The new responsibilities 
included: 
* acting in an advisory capacity to the City Commission, 
City staff and the designated developer by reviewing, 
commenting and advising on projects and proposals 
which affected the redevelopment of the CBD; and 
* acting as a mechanism for informing the community of 
the plans and process of the downtown redevelopment 
and representing the interests of the entire community. 
The DRAB was made up of nine voting members appointed by the Mayor, plus a 
nonvoting member designated by the Commission to act as a staff consultant 
and liaison between the Commission and the Board. That person was a staff 
member who later became the Downtown Redevelopment Coordinator. 
Older Manhattan Neighborhood Association was also a constant source of sup- 
port since the beginning of the redevelopment process. OMNA is an organiza- 
tion "dedicated to the preservation and strengthening of older neighborhoods" 
in Manhattan. It is a voluntary, nonpartisan community organization. Their 
interest in the redevelopment projects is based on the thinking that "the older 
neighborhood which now is most threatened is our own downtown." (Manhattan 
Mercury, April 13, 1981) OMNA's role was, simply, as an independent, self- 
appointed public information organization. Between 1977 and 1981, OMNA held 
five meetings, open to the public to consider various issues related to the 
project. In addition, the organization would, in its monthly newsletter, de- 
scribe aspects of the project, comment on the issues and inform the reader of 
hearing dates and locations. The newsletter was mailed to every household in 
the City's target area as described in Manhattan's Community Development Block 
Grant (CDBG) application and any other member. The organization also had 
representatives speak at most public hearings in favor of various aspects 
of the project. 
Another organization which was in favor of the redevelopment project was the 
League of Women Voters of Manhattan-Riley County. Their position of support 
was adopted in 1977. This position was reached after concensus had been reached 
by its membership. The League is a nonpartisan organization. It is dedicated 
to the participation in governmental and community of an informed citizenry. 
To accomplish this goal, the League had available, particularly during elec- 
tions, information related to all aspects of the project. It wrote letters 
of support for grant applications made by the City and to the local newspaper. 
It had representatives speak in favor of various aspects of the project. Like 
OMNA, it organized a Candidate's Forum during the 1981 City Commission elec- 
tion campaign where all candidates responded to a variety of issues, includ- 
ing the Downtown Redevelopment Project. 
Finally, Kansas State University offered several resources which aided the 
City in developing and implementing various aspects of its plan. Since 1971, 
faculty in the school's College of Architecture and Design have been consul- 
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tants and collaborators through many aspects of the project. It was the direc- 
tor of the Department of Regional and Community Planning (RCP), Vernon Deines, 
who sparked efforts in 1971 for the City to add a full-time planner to its 
staff. Two other professors in that department, Ray Weisenburger and Claude 
A. Keithley, were consultants during the 1971-1972 John's Tract rezoning re- 
quests. The former served the opponents of the request; the latter served 
the proponents. Later, in 1981, Professor Keithley along with another RCP 
professor, Clarence Johnson, were hired by the City as technical consultants 
to assist in the completion of Manhattan's Urban Development Action Grant ap- 
plication. 
In addition to these persons, several others from KSU offered services. Bernd 
Foerster, Dean of the College of Architecture and Design, became openly in- 
volved with the project in 1976 when he would speak at public hearings in oppo- 
sition to developments which would not be in concert with the community's de- 
sign or values. Later, in 1979, he became the first chairman of DRAB and ex- 
pressed his support from that perspective. Other architecture professors, 
Richard Forsyth and Richard Wagner, were involved in applying for a Design 
Demonstration Grant from the National Endowment for the Arts which was the 
focal point of one of the several approaches which made up the redevelopment 
project. 
The People Involved 
Although most efforts were offered by various groups, the redevelopment process 
was also guided and influenced by the work of several individuals. In fact, 
without the contributions of these people, the project could not have been as 
comprehensive or complex as the one finally agreed upon. Each of these indi- 
viduals will be introduced and the role of each described in this section. 
They are: Gary Stith, Manhattan's Chief Planner and Downtown Redevelopment 
Coordinator; M. Don Harmon, Manhattan's City Manager; Jud Allen, of Trkla, 
Pettigrew, Allen, and Payne in Chicago who was the City's financial consultant; 
and several City Commissioners. 
The person most responsible for the progress and integration of the downtown 
redevelopment process was Gary Stith. Gary came to Manhattan in November of 
1976 as the City's second Chief Planner. This was only three months after the 
City Commission decision regarding the SBL requests for rezoning the "John's" 
tract. It was primarily due to his efforts that the downtown redevelopment was 
given direction and momentum. 
Gary came to Manhattan after working for 1f years as a Senior Planner in Wheat- 
land, Wyoming, in a multi-jurisdictional planning agency. Prior to working in 
Wyoming, he had been a City Planner in Barquisimeto, Venezuela, with the Peace 
Corps. His background included a broad range of planning tasks with an empha- 
sis in citizen participation. For example, while in Wyoming he established the 
County Parks and Recreation Board and the Health Services Coordinating Council 
as well as administering the usual tasks encountered in county planning. 
The planning staff which had been serving the City since the early 1970's was 
apparently not inclined toward self-motivation or innovation. In fact, while 
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researching this report, no mention of any activities was found regarding the 
Manhattan planning staff. Professional planning input was, however, offered 
by the Director of the Regional Planning Council, also located in Manhattan. 
The City planning function was, apparently, a bureaucratic exercise until Gary 
came to Manhattan. When the governing bodies insisted progress be made regard- 
ing downtown redevelopment, it was because of his insight and through his recom- 
mendations that a direction was taken. He know what process would be required 
to realistically create a project, what resources the community had to offer, 
and how to fill the gap between what was available and what was needed. 
In December of 1979, his responsibilities were expanded when, in addition to 
being Chief Planner, Gary became Manhattan's Downtown Redevelopment Coordina- 
tor. In that role, he was expected to: 
* coordinate City activities with the developer; 
* represent the City's interest in dealing with the 
developer; 
* act as staff to the Downtown Redevelopment Advisory 
Board; 
* coordinate staff efforts under the City Manager's 
supervision; 
* be responsible for development of the City's Re- 
development Program 
- financing 
- physical design and public improvements 
- management of program; 
* act as liaison with Downtown, 
* act as an Ombudsman for downtown; 
* maintain a good working relationship with downtown 
property owners and merchants. 
Gary's efforts, however, would have been impossible to implement unless the 
City administration was receptive to his ideas and was willing and able to im- 
plement them. In May of 1978, Manhattan hired a new City Manager who would 
be receptive and able to facilitate the procedures necessary. In fact, he 
had been involved in implementing downtown revitalizations previously in his 
career. 
M. Don Harmon came to Manhattan from Council Bluffs, Iowa, where he had been 
the City Manager for 10 years. He was described as being 27-year veteran 
of city administration (with) a particular background in downtown redevelop- 
ment." (Manhattan Mercury, May 4, 1978) In fact, his involvement in downtown 
redevelopment had been a major factor in his selection. He had been involved 
in the process in three of the cities he had worked in: Boulder, Colorado; 
Joplin, Missouri; and Council Bluffs. More specifically, "(a)mong his major 
accomplishments at Council Bluffs included construction of a new downtown all- 
weather shopping mall." 
The experience and abilities of Mr. Harmon combined with those of Gary Stith 
created a partnership which paved the way for the events to come. 
The third person whose abilities made development of a reasonable plan possi- 
ble was Jud Allen. Jud was contracted to serve as the City's financial consul- 
tant in 1980. He is one of the principles in the 
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firm of Trkla, Pettigrew, 
Allen and Payne in Chicago. He was responsible to a large degree for the 
brainstorming which led to the development of project components which would 
meet program needs and which could be realistically financed. For example, 
it had been as a result of Jud's suggestions that the Southside Development 
Area was conceived. It was meant to provide a relocation site for many busi- 
nesses in other parts of the redevelopment area and also to create an area 
where financing would be locally based in order to balance concerns of local 
businesses and others who were concerned that too much influence would be 
granted to "outsiders," such as the Federal government and the major private 
investor from Ohio, due to the huge investments they would be making. 
Finally, mention should be made of several City Commissioners who supported 
the redevelopment from its beginning and who were able to influence its initia- 
tion. Russel Reitz was retired after 36 years with the USDA. He was still 
locally employed in renovating homes in Manhattan. He had long supported the 
project. In his 1977 reelection campaign, he indicated that part of the fund- 
ing "must come from public funds which (he) plan(ned) to support." (Manhattan 
Mercury, April 1, 1977) 
Edward Horne had been the. City Attorney from 1972 to 1978. He was aware of 
the various mechanisms which could be used by the City to "facilitate the 
redevelopment plan." (Ibid) Gene Klingler is a surgeon. As with Reitz and 
Horne, Klingler was supportive of the City's use of planning, zoning and other 
mechanisms to guide the development. 
Terry Glasscock was a banker and businessman. He felt that "the redevelopment 
of the central business district is in the best interests of all Manhattan 
citizens and (he) strongly support(ed) this effort." (Ibid) 
All of these men were on the City Commission through April, 1981. Klingler 
and Reitz have remained on the Commission to the present. Both Glasscock and 
Horne chose not to seek reelection. During the 1981 Commission election, each 
of these persons was involved in what became known in the newspaper as "The 
Truth Squad." This was a group of private citizens who organized to dispense 
factual information about the redevelopment process and to answer questions 
raised by the anti-mall candidates. 
Summary 
This, then, was the environment in which the redevelopment project was to be- 
gin. The City's historical, social, and economic background combined with 
the efforts of several groups and individuals created the basis from which the 
community would begin in creating its project. The process which was followed 
and the project which resulted will be described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PROJECT 
"We Need A Plan" 
-Gary Stith 
YES 
By 1978 it had become clear to the City Commission and the City staff that 
steps were needed regarding the conservation of the downtown area. It was 
evident that the downtown did not effectively meet the commercial needs of 
the City. Trade was being lost to Topeka, and inadequate facilities, such 
as poor access and circulation and poor distribution of parking, did not make 
shopping in the CBD a pleasant experience. 
Gary Stith, the Chief Planner for the City, recommended that the Commission 
hire a consultant to make several determinations. First, was the policy of 
retaining the CBD as the regional shopping center a viable one? Although the 
1969 Land Use Plan had recommended that this be a goal of the City, nothing 
had been done to implement that policy. Second, the City wanted the consul- 
tant to sketch a step-by-step redevelopment plan. 
Stith said, "Until we get a plan, the downtown will be floundering until the 
next shopping center proposal comes along, which may not be too long." (Man- 
hattan Mercury, April 9, 1978) If downtown redevelopment were found to be 
feasible, it would be necessary to begin urban designs, engineering, program- 
ming, and attracting private sector investment. If it were found to be not 
feasible, it would be necessary to determine a different function for downtown 
and to serve notice that proposals would be considered for a regional shopping 
center somewhere else in the City. 
On April 11, 1978, the City Commission unanimously approved that $50,000.00 of 
Community Development Block Grant funds be earmarked for this plan and author- 
ized the staff to accept proposals. This was two weeks after the decision to 
turn down the Johns' Tract rezoning request. Mayor Linder said, "I'm convinced 
that it's now or never for the downtown business district. If the City moves 
from 1978 to 1979 without any significant action being done on downtown revi- 
talization, 'all will be lost.'" (Manhattan Mercury, April 19, 1978) At a 
special August 22, 1978, meeting, the Commission selected the Boulder, Colorado, 
firm, Briscoe, Maphis, Murray and Lamont, to conduct a CBD study as "the first 
step toward possible redevelopment." (Manhattan Mercury, August 23, 1978) 
The choice was based on the firm's approach to citizen participation and its 
experience in economic analysis, design, and implementation. 
The consultants held a series oftpublic meetings involving City and County of7 
ficials as well as members of civic, community and neighborhood organizations. 
They appealed for public comments and asked that any such comments be sent in 
care of the City PTinning Office. As a result of this input, the major down- 
town issues were determined to be the: 
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* circulation and parking; 
* operation of businesses; 
* image of the downtown; and 
* other miscellaneous concerns. 
In addition, through their economic analysis they determined that: 
* the market is in Manhattan and that it was inevitable 
that a shopping center would locate somewhere in the 
City; 
* there was a need and a demand for more stores; 
* a cosmetic-type of redevelopment, such as that in 
Lawrence, Kansas, would not suffice; 
* 10-11 City blocks should be used; 
* some uses or businesses should be relocated; 
* the neighborhoods surrounding the CBD should be pro- 
tected: 
"If we are not sensitive, if the community 
is not sensitive, downtown revitalization 
can be disasterous for the surrounding neigh- 
borhoods."; and 
one major improvement would be the construction of a 
southern arterial street -- with or without downtown 
redevelopment. 
Several months later, as their study became more detailed, the consultants 
recommended that regardless of where the mall would be located or the results 
of downtown redevelopment, the facilities in the downtown needed to be improved. 
They also suggested that: 
* a southern arterial street be constructed; 
* several specific uses and businesses be relocated; 
* there be improvements made on the bridge; 
* the parking lots be improved; 
* a hotel/conference center be considered, especially 
if a shopping center were built; 
* the Wareham Hotel be revitalized; 
* Poyntz Avenue be improved; 
* A visual and functional connection be made between 
Poyntz and the Kansas River. 
Finally, in April, they suggested a specific project which they felt would best 
meet Manhattan's needs. This was to close off the east end of Poyntz for an 
indoor mall. They continued that a developer may be hired and prefer a differ- 
ent approach. A mall project would require construction of the southern ar- 
terial. They suggested a project which would involve approximately 20 acres, 
three major department stores, and a total of 500,000 square feet of retail 
space. Also encouraged was pursuit of a conference center. In addition, 
several themes were stressed which had been determined as a result of surveys, 
such as: 
* to retain the character of the local community as much 
as possible; 
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* that the project was "economically feasible, socially 
highly desirable, physically possible and historically 
appropriate; 
* to provide pedestrian walkways; 
* that a variety of uses be considered, including enter- 
tainment, athletic clubs, recreation or arts center or 
a farmers' market; 
* that a link be reestablished with the Kansas River; and 
that historic buildings be rehabilitated. 
Also encouraged in the plan was the notion that "the importance of private in- 
vestments and the needs of the development industry" be recognized and that 
opportunity be provided for public and private joint development efforts. 
Public opinion at this time was favorable. In an April 24 survey conducted 
by the Manhattan Mercury found that six of eight businesses in the CBD sup- 
ported the redevelopment concept. Relocation, however, was a concern. In a 
telephone survey, reported on April 29, the newspaper asked the following 
question: 
"Do you support constructing a shopping mall somewhere 
within the 100 and 400 blocks of Poyntz in downtown 
Manhattan?" 
The results were that 65% of those responding were in favor of such a project. 
The dominant concern of the 32% who opposed the idea was costs. On April 27, 
1979, editorial stated that there was a public recognition that the benefits 
of downtown redevelopment would be worth the costs. The Chamber of Commerce 
announced its support early in May of 1979. 
In June, 1979, the consultants completed their written report and plan for 
Manhattan. It was entitled "Yes! Downtown Manhattan; Manhattan, Kansas, 
Downtown Redevelopment Plan." It came to be referred to as the Yes Plan. 
Getting Organized 
Based on the Yes Plan the Governing Body decided to go ahead and plan for a 
downtown redevelopment which would include rehabilitation of some existing 
structures and construction of an enclosed shopping mall. The Commission's 
next effort was three-fold: 
* to choose a developer; 
* to appoint a community advisory group; and 
* to choose a downtown redevelopment coordinator. 
The day after the consultants presented their final report to the Commission, 
four of eight developers were interviewed. The remaining four were interviewed 
within two weeks. Of those eight, the field was narrowed to four and then to 
two. Visits were made to projects developed by each of the two finalists. 
Matt Truell, a reporter for the Manhattan Mercury, went on this trip with the 
City representatives and wrote in a positive editorial saying, "A facelift for 
downtown Manhattan...seems to have reached the point of inevitability." 
(Manhattan Mercury, September 23, 1979) 
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At their October 2, 1979, meeting, the Commission chose as the redeveloper 
Forest City Rental Properties Corp. of Cleveland. The choice was unanimous 
and was made based on: 
* the organization's size; 
* their level of expertise; 
* their strong financial backing; and 
* the fact that their designated architects, RTKL of 
Baltimore, had a national reputation and had been 
involved with downtown projects since the 1940's. 
The resolution officially establishing their relationship was adopted on 
October 16, 1979. 
Three weeks later, on November 6, 1979, the Commission adopted a resolution to 
establish a Downtown Redevelopment Advisory Board. The reason for creating the 
Board was to assure the Commission had "advise and council of a citizen board." 
DRAB replaced the Downtown Redevelopment Committee which was dissolved. 
The third matter was that of hiring or appointing a Redevelopment Coordinator. 
This was created to be a temporary contract position. From the beginning it 
was known that this would be a diverse and demanding job. The Coordinator 
would be at the center of the entire project. He would be responsible for 
downtown business relations; would establish non-profit development corpora- 
tions; he would coordinate information to and from such groups as the Chamber 
of Commerce, civic organizations, development committees, developers, financial 
institutions and City government. 
The position was also to "assist in conducting community outreach programs and 
"coordinate various services in support of community improvements and downtown 
development." It was expected that the person hired would be a graduate in 
economics, social sciences, planning or communications, but a Master's Degree 
was preferred. 
The person chosen for the job was Gary Stith. He had functioned as the Rede- 
velopment Coordinator as part of his position of Chief Planner. It was a 
role he would maintain through the entire process in addition to his other 
duties, including his promotion to the position of Community Development De- 
partment Director. 
These three components were the sources of information and input to the City 
Commission. DRAB provided public input and community review of the process; 
staff provided the management team under the Redevelopment Coordinator; and 
the developer developed and coordinated design, engineering and financial as- 
pects of the project. (See Plate 10) 
The Project 
December, 1979 & January, 1980 
By December, 1979, the organization had been created and the project could be 
developed. At the first DRAB meeting on December 12, Stith 
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"stressed that the downtown redevelopment was for the 
Central Business District as a whole and would involve 
the conservation and redevelopment of the entire area, 
and not just that area directly affected by the mall 
project. He indicated that the mall was a means to that 
end of redeveloping the downtown, and was not an end in 
itself." 
(DRAB Minutes, December 12, 1979) 
The first major decision would be the selection of a location for the mall 
project. Details regarding the redevelopment program, especially those deal- 
ing with the rehabilitation area, could not be developed until that decision 
was made. Once the developer had selected a site and staff had reviewed the 
selection, DRAB would also review the site options. "Timing on this review 
(was) very important and until the developer feels that a site option and 
scheme for the development that is functional is developed, he does not want 
the alternatives to be reviewed in public." (Ibid) 
At the outset, there were several activities which needed to be started in the 
near future. Others were awaiting court decisions regarding the constitution- 
ality of several funding mechanisms which could be incorporated into the project. 
These elements were: 
* watching for State legislation being proposed by the 
City of Wichita of commercial improvement districts 
to finance maintenance enforcement and promotional ac- 
tivities; 
* trying to find funding for a facade improvement program 
and cosmetic improvements in the downtown area includ- 
ing a possible local development corporation; 
* awaiting a January State Supreme Court decision regarding 
the constitutionality of the Tax Increment Financing 
statutes; 
* working with the developer, who had already submitted 
five of six schemes for City staff to review and who 
had already contracted to have a market analysis con- 
ducted; 
* hiring a financial consultant, beginning with the sending 
of a scope of services to various potential consultants; 
and 
* including the programming of downtown improvements in the 
Capital Improvements Program. 
By the end of January, 1980, progress in several areas could be seen. The 
legislation proposed by Wichita was available in more detail. It 
"would allow for a district to be formed by petition of the 
property owners within the district with assessments being 
distributed based on a formula adopted as part of that bene- 
fit district. The district can be established for maintenance 
of landscaping, enforcement of traffic and traffic regulations, 
special security, public promotional activities, any kind of 
service which would benefit the properties or the businesses 
in the downtown area which could operate on an annual basis." 
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In addition, a possible funding source was found which could be used to up- 
grade, maintain, and conserve the area of the downtown outside the mall. This 
was a Design Demonstration Grant through the National Endowment for the Arts. 
"Stith suggested that it is important that this area be 
upgraded and stabilized to allow for it to remain in a 
competitive status with the new mall and to take advan- 
tage of the draw the new mall would provide to the down- 
town area." (DRAB, January 2, 1980) 
There were four program areas which could be funded through this grant should 
it be received. These were: 
* design workshops for community organizations, down- 
town groups, downtown property owners; 
* facade improvement study; 
* streetscapes -- street furniture, lighting, signage, 
landscaping, paving to integrate rehab area with 
new mall. This use of design to physically inte- 
grate the two areas is critical to insure that the 
downtown works as a unit and the entire area is 
stabilized and redeveloped; and 
* develop public spaces for cultural activities in the 
downtown area. 
City staff, in coordination with KSU faculty, began preparing an application. 
Also, the State Supreme Court had upheld the Tax Increment Financing statutes. 
As a result, City staff was going to begin the process necessary to utilize 
this mechanism as part of the financial package for the redevelopment. 
In 1979, the Kansas State Legislature established "a comprehensive law to 
authorize cities to redevelop blighted 'central business district areas,' 
to be financed by privated developers and by the issuance of city bonds re- 
tired by the property tax increment." Simply put, a tax increment district 
must be defined, and that district must meet six of ten criteria which the 
State statute calls "blighted conditions." After approval by taxing bodies, 
here the City Commission, the County Commission and the U.S.D. 383 Board of 
Education, the valuation of all property within the district would be frozen. 
Bonds would then be issued based on an estimate of expected improvements. 
Once redevelopment is complete, the properties will be reassessed and any 
increase in the taxes collected because of the increased value will be pledged 
toward repayment of the bonds which financed the initial investment. 
In compliance with the statutory requirements, City staff, directed by Gary 
Stith, prepared a report "to determine whether structural and environmental 
conditions in the proposed redevelopment project area in the Manhattan Cen- 
tral Business District warrant its designation as a blighted area under the 
provisions of the Kansas Tax Increment Redevelopment Law...and the Kansas 
Urban Renewal Law." (Elig Report, p.1) To be eligible for redevelopment 
under these requirements, the City Commission must find that 
1. the area to be redeveloped is a blighted area; and 
2. the conservation development or redevelopment of the 
project area is necessary to promote the general 
and economic welfare of the City. 
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According to the statute, an area is considered blighted if the presence of 
a majority of the following factors impairs or arrests "the sound development 
and growth of a municipality or constitutes an economic or social liability 
or is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present 
condition and use: 
1. a substantial number of deteriorated or deterior- 
ating structures; 
2. predominance of defective or inadequate street 
layout; 
3. unsanitary or unsafe conditions; 
4. deterioration of site improvements; 
5. diversity of ownership; 
6. tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding 
the fair value of the land; 
7. defective or unusual conditions of title; 
8. improper subdivision or obsolete platting or 
land uses; 
9. the existence of conditions which endanger life 
or property by fire and other causes; 
10. conditions which create economic obsolescenses." 
The developer, represented by Mel Roebuck, and RTKL, had continued working on 
various layouts and designs bringing the total number of schemes reviewed by 
staff to thirteen. None could, however, be considered final until the Market- 
ing Analysis and a traffic study had been completed. 
Procedures also continued on the review of financial consultants. 
February & March, 1980 
In the next two months several developments further added to the complexity 
of the process. One of those was the suggestion made by the City Manager 
that City Hall be converted to provide a recreational center and other kinds 
of community activities. It would have been necessary to include the project 
in the downtown effort as the Community Development Block Grant funds had 
been cut back. It would also require the development of a financial mechanism 
for developing a City-County office in the downtown area which would consoli- 
date facilities without affecting function. 
"Stith reminded the Board of the considerations of Ron 
Straka in the Downtown Redevelopment Plan indicated 
that a generator to anchor the west end of the downtown 
area would be very important to maintain the stability 
of the retailing area between 3rd Street and 5th Street. 
Some sort of office development, particularly related 
to governmental activities, could draw considerable a- 
mount of traffic in the downtown area, and would also 
place more employees in the downtown area, which could 
support specialty shopping and restaurants in the area 
of downtown outside the mall." (DRAB, February 13, 1980) 
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A trip in March to Washington, D.C., included a visit to the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. There people who administer the Urban Devel- 
opment Action Grant "'seemed quite interested in our project'" (Manhattan 
Mercury, March 26, 1980) and encouraged submission of an application. 
The public relations and information aspects of the process were considered 
and initiated at this time. Two items were begun. The possibility of dis- 
tributing a newsletter was discussed and finally, in May of 1980, the first 
"Poyntz of Interest" was printed. The City mailed a copy to all property 
owners and businesses in the downtown area, community organizations, civic 
leaders, the public library and anyone else who requested being on the mail- 
ing list. In addition, the local cable television station had expressed in- 
terest in providing 15 minutes twice each week for the discussion of devel- 
opments in the downtown project. Members of DRAB, the Commission, and staff 
were encouraged to make themselves available to talk about the redevelopment 
with service and community organizations. 
A lobbying effort was created to support both Wichita's Commercial Improvement 
District (CID) legislation and a proposed constitutional amendment which 
would allow for an increased availability of federal monies in Kansas for in- 
ternal improvements. This second was of particular importance to Manhattan 
for two reasons. It would allow for more monies to be available for historic 
preservation and also for the relocation of railroad tracks. 
Also, during that time the developer had hired engineering consultants to com- 
plete a traffic study. The purpose of the study was to analyze the existing 
traffic patterns and problems and propose solutions in light of the proposed 
redevelopment. 
April, 1980 
As work progressed, additional potential funding sources were discovered. 
One which was seen as a viable addition to the project was a Visual Arts Grant 
from the National Endowment for the Arts. A grant application was prepared 
requesting the maximum amount of Federal dollars, $50,000.00, to be matched 
by an equal amount of local resources. The monies would be used to commission 
a nationally known artist to create a sculpture in the plaza area between the 
mall and the rehabilitation area. 
"The project would be located in the downtown area, 
focusing on the potentials for an art work in the 
public plaza which will be developed in the center 
of the downtown area. The intent is to provide 
amenities and make the area more attractive and 
give a sense of focus to the downtown area." (DRAB 
Minutes, April 16, 1980) 
The most dramatic event in April, though, was the public release by Roebuck 
of some tentative mall designs. In general, there would be three major de- 
partment stores with other retail shops. It was to be approximately 410,000 
square feet and would incorporate some existing buildings. 
On April 21, the proposed plans were presented for public consideration. They 
were explained by the developer and architect at a widely advertised open pub- 
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lic meeting in the City Auditorium. After a presentation by Stith, there 
was a period of questions and answers. City officials, the developer, and 
the architect were all available and responded to the extent possible with 
the information that was available at that time. 
The response to the meeting in the newspaper, in both article and editorial, 
was positive. The proposal was described as "progress." There were, however, 
some people at the meeting who were not satisfied with the discussion. One 
could hear comments such as, "He's not answering the question," among those 
attending the meeting. Such statements were usually from those who operated 
businesses within the mall site and wanted answers to specific questions on 
relocation assistance, just compensation and the certainty of the project. 
Specifics on each of these issues had not been worked out at that point. In 
fact, it is not possible to have those answers until the plan is final and 
approved, which to date has yet to be completed. 
May, 1980 
In May, two plans were completed by staff and considered by the advisory boards 
and the City Commission. The Tax Increment Financing Eligibility Report was 
completed and ready for review. Also, a CBD Land Use Element had been pre- 
pared as part of the General Land Use Plan. 
The findings of the Tax Increment Financing Eligibility Report were that the 
15 block study area (See Plate 11) met the requirements for designation as 
a "blighted area." Two of the criteria, #6 - tax or special assessment delin- 
quency exceeding the fair value of the land, and #8 - defective or unusual 
conditions of title, were found to be inappropriate. However, the remaining 
8 criteria were met. A summary of each of those indicated that: 
* Substantial number of deteriorated or deteriorating 
structures: Of the 152 buildings in the study area, 
6 (4%) are structurally substandard and 100 (66%) are 
deteriorated to either a minor or major degree. 
Predominance of defective or inadequate street layout: 
In general, the Central Business District circulation 
system is hindered by poor one-way streets, ineffec- 
tive intersections, inadequate parking, and poor 
pedestrian movement. 
* Unsanitary or unsafe conditions: Surveys done in 9 
of the 15 blocks show that a total of 119 unsanitary 
and unsafe conditions exist in the area. Of that total, 
four blocks (16, 19, 25 & 26) display the greatest 
number of unsafe and unsanitary conditions (85%). 
* Deterioration of site improvements: All 15 blocks 
in the study area exhibit some degree of deterioration 
in site improvements. Four blocks which displayed the 
greatest problems were the 400 block north of Poyntz 
and the 100, 200 and 300 blocks of Houston Street. 
* Diversity of ownership: The study area contains 152 
structures on 146 parcels, which are under 140 separate 
ownerships. Such a large diversity of ownerships im- 
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PLATE 11 
STUDY AREA 
pairs the optimum development of the Central Business 
District and the City's economic growth. 
* Improper subdivision or obsolete platting or land uses: 
Of the 15 blocks under study, all but 9 and 13 exhibit 
conditions of improper subdivision or obsolete plat- 
ting. Nonconforming and incompatible uses can be found 
on every block in the study area. 
* Existence of conditions which endanger life or property 
by fire and other causes: In the nine block area sur- 
veyed, all had buildings with designs which would pro- 
mote the spread of fire, four had buildings with exit 
violations, and four had buildings with firewall damage. 
* Conditions which create economic obsolescence: The Cen- 
tral Business District is not meeting the needs of the 
regional market. Existing retailing facilities are in- 
adequate and obsolete. Parking and pedestrian circu- 
lation do not meet the shopper's needs. This results 
in the loss of retail sales, sales tax revenues, jobs, 
and economic activity to the Manhattan community. 
Property values in the Central Business District have 
declined indicating economic obsolescense and a loss 
of tax base. 
In addition, it was necessary to prepare a Redevelopment Plan to qualify for 
TIF. The Planning Board was to determine that plans conformance to the Com- 
prehensive General Plan of the City. Because the CBD had not been considered 
in any of the elements of the City's Land Use Plan, it was 
first necessary to prepare the Central Business District Land Use Element. 
The CBD Land Use Element was intended to describe the concepts to assure "the 
integration of social, aesthetic, environmental, economic, and historical fac- 
tors" and presented objectives for "promoting, preserving or enhancing those 
concepts, and planning and urban design considerations." Although the docu- 
ment did provide this information, it was not actually an original work. It 
was a "cut-and-paste" version of the YES Plan completed by Briscoe, Maphis, 
Murray and Lemont. Aspects which had not been considered significant or ap- 
plicable by the staff were eliminated and the remainder compiled into a re- 
port. 
June & July, 1980 
In June a meeting was held to discuss a different aspect of the project. 
Roebuck, Stith, the City Engineer, the City's Director of Services, and the 
project architect met with the traffic engineers to consider design criteria 
of the project as they related to the proposed flow of traffic. Four speci- 
fic factors were highlighted: 
* facades along 3rd Street where the mall development 
would face the existing downtown area; 
* use orientation and design of the public plaza area 
at the east end of Poyntz Avenue; 
* design of the east end mall development; and 
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* interface of the mall development with the Farmers 
Cooperative area. 
There was discussion at the June DRAB meeting on the need for an office de- 
velopment in the 500 block of Poyntz Avenue. The justification for this type 
of project was identical to that of converting City Hall into an office/recrea- 
tional center which had been previously considered. That project had fallen 
by the wayside since financial resources could not reasonably be allocated 
to the project. CDBG funding had been cut and including the project as part 
of the downtown financial package was not viable because extension of the 
TIF boundaries to include the building was unreasonable. The lot was five 
blocks west of the area defined as the CBD. 
In July, Roebuck announced that the Market Analysis had been completed. Brief- 
ly, it had concluded that there was sufficient untapped market potential in 
Manhattan to support a shopping mall anchored by three major department stores. 
Two of these should be "national mass merchandise type chain department stores" 
and the third "a major Kansas or Missouri department store." In addition, the 
market would support additional specialty store space 180,000 square feet. The 
results of the Analysis would be used by the developer to attract department 
stores to the mall project. Also, more design work had been completed which 
included some changes as a result of the traffic study. Some of the new de- 
signs included the phasing in of a fourth department store. 
An application for an Urban Development Action Grant was being prepared by 
City staff. It was expected to be ready for submission in February, 1981, 
rather than November, 1980, as had been previously hoped. The setback was 
because of the lack of commitments from department stores. Those commitments 
are required for completion of the application. 
The UDAG funds would be used to reduce the costs to the City and the developer 
of developing in the CBD and to create a financial situation for the developer 
which would be at least as attractive as that which would exist on the urban 
fringe. 
"The necessity for an Urban Development Action Grant or 
similar federal grant assistance is based on a financial 
gap caused by development of a regional shopping mall 
in the Central Business District. Development costs 
would naturally be lower for the developer if construc- 
tion takes place on a suburban site. Central Business 
District development will require the public and private 
participants to incur extra costs in the area of acquisi- 
tion, relocation of businesses and residents and demoli- 
tion of structures. Relocation and/or construction of 
new public facilities such as water mains, storm sewers 
and streets are costs associated with development at 
any site, but are more complicated and usually more 
expensive in a Central Business District project. All 
of these factors necessitate the receipt of a UDAG to 
complete the proposed project. 
The specific uses and amount of funds requested are de- 
tailed in Part II, Section B.7.a. General activities 
and amounts are as follows: 
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Acquisition 
Relocation 
Demolition 
Union Pacific Railroad Yard Relocation 
Administration 
Contingencies 
$ 6.902 million 
.691 million 
.300 million 
3.000 million 
.407 million 
.200 million 
TOTAL $ 11.500 million 
This $11.5 million is the gap caused by extra costs of 
Central Business District redevelopment." 
(UDAG Application, P.II-91) 
August & September, 1980 
The rest of the summer was spent in continuing several processes that were 
already underway. The Eligibility Report for Tax Increment Financing was sent 
to the County Commission and the School District for their review. In Sep- 
tember, the City Commission adopted a resolution of Tax Increment Financing 
Eligibility. 
An office space study and a market study had begun to determine the feasi- 
bility of an office development in the 500 block of Poyntz. After receiving 
recoverable analyses from both, staff prepared an Office Complex Development 
Brochure to solicit developers who might wish to invest in an office complex 
development." The objectives of the development as stated in the brochure 
were: 
1. Office space in this location would bring more 
employees and shoppers into the downtown area 
during the day. 
2. Creation of more parking space for overflow of 
commercial activities. 
3. Creation of a visual anchor on the west end of 
the downtown district. 
The transportation study was also completed during this time. 
DRAB decided that it needed to get more information to the whole community. 
The newsletter, "Poyntz of Interest," was sent only to downtown businesses 
and on request. Broadening the base of public information was necessary. Con- 
crete suggestions, however, were not developed. 
Also related to public information, staff said it had completed a brochure 
which would be followed in the event of business and residential displacement 
in the course of redevelopment. 
October & November, 1980 
In October, public meetings were held to give information and to receive input 
on two matters. Two meetings were held regarding the Southern Arterial. This 
arterial was originally considered to be the best method of improving access 
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into the CBD in the 1969 Land Use Plan and was part of the City's general 
neighborhood renewal plan under the Urban Renewal Program. This was to be 
a four-lane arterial street across the south side of the City along the Rock 
Island Railroad Right-of-way between Fort Riley Boulevard on the west and 
the viaduct on the east. (See Plate 12) 
The YES Plan had indicated that such an arterial be constructed whether or 
not the downtown were redeveloped. Eventually, once the process had begun, 
it became clear that major department stores would consider commitment to the 
project only if the arterial would become a reality. 
The Southern Arterial was incorporated as an aspect of the redevelopment pro- 
cess through its inclusion in the Downtown Redevelopment Plan, the Central 
Business District Plan and the City's Capital Improvements Program. Its con- 
struction would involve the relocation of Union Pacific tracks and the Mar- 
shalling Yards. 
Location of funds was the major stumbling block. Federal sources were not 
available. State funds were limited to maintenance and did not include new 
construction. Local funding would have required, because of Commission prom- 
ises, a referendum and the likelyhood of its passage was uncertain. Manhat- 
tanites wanted as much as possible without spending any local revenue. Eventu- 
ally, the costs of construction of the arterial were included in the UDAG re- 
quest. 
Another meeting considered the relocation assistance which would be available 
to businesses and residents should the redevelopment force their moving. The 
meeting was open to the public but specifically for those businesses and 
property owners which might be relocated as a part of the redevelopment. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss in general the assistance which would 
be required by federal regulations. 
Also during this time, the City hired Warren Butler as a UDAG consultant. 
Butler, who had his office in Washington, D.C., had been a U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development official during President Nixon's administration. 
It was expected that with the election of another Republican President, he 
would again be an effective inside source of advise and information. More 
importantly, at the time Butler was employed by approximately 10 cities, in- 
cluding Kansas City, with UDAG projects. 
December, 1980 & January, 1981 
In December of 1980 it was announced that work would begin on the Downtown 
Design Project in February, 1982. It was to be funded through the NEA Design 
Demonstration Grant which had been approved. The project area (See Plate 13) 
included approximately 10 blocks. Emphasis would be along Poyntz Avenue be- 
tween Third Street and Juliette Avenue. 
Tom Keohan, a KSU student in architecture, was selected as the project manager. 
Two assistants, a part -time draftsperson and he would be responsible for ac- 
complishing the program objectives. Together they would be supervised by 
Stith, Richard Wagner, Professor of Architecture, KSU, and Richard Forsyth, 
Professor of Landscape Architecture, Kansas State University. 
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The grant was designed to accomplish several objectives and guidelines out- 
lined in Manhattan's Downtown Redevelopment Plan. The three elements to be 
addressed were: 
* streetscape design; 
* a plan for cultural activities in centers; and 
* a Facade Improvement Study. 
There were six program objectives which would be met through these design ele- 
ments. These were: 
* to promote the understanding of Poyntz Avenue as 
the "Main Street" for Manhattan; 
* to encourage the revitalization of the buildings 
along Poyntz Avenue; 
* to develop an environment which invites and encour- 
ages both spontaneous and planned cultural and re- 
creational opportunities; 
* to promote the "pedestrianization" of Poyntz Avenue; 
* to conserve, restore and revitalize the historical 
character of the buildings along Poyntz Avenue; 
and 
* to provide an opportunity for public and private 
joint development efforts. 
Also in December, the Manhattan Arts Council waged a fund raising drive. 
$50,000 would be needed to match $50,000 requested on an NEA Arts in Public 
Places grant. Although the drive raised more than enough funds, the grant 
was eventually denied by the NEA. The reason for the denial was that there 
could be no project unless the mall project became a reality; that is until 
and unless that aspect of redevelopment was certain. 
Spring, 1981 
In February, the Southside Redevelopment Plan was adopted as part of the CBD 
Land Use Element Plan. The purpose of the plan was to provide the necessary 
guidelines, framework, and opportunity for redevelopment of an area south of 
the core of the CBD "to accommodate existing desirable land uses and activities, 
uses that will be relocated from the proposed mall area, and other uses and 
activities that recognize investment opportunities in the area." (CBD - South- 
side Redevelopment Plan) The major impetus for the plan was to provide space 
for relocation of desirable businesses and to take advantage of investment 
opportunities brought about by better access to be provided by the Southern 
Arterial. 
The objectives of the plan were: 
1. To identify those land uses most appropriate for 
the area and encourage consolidation of compatible 
activities. Maintenance of and provision for ex- 
pansion to existing businesses should not be dis- 
couraged. 
2. To provide zoning incentives which will reduce lim- 
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iting requirements while encouraging more efficient 
use of land and implementation of public improvements. 
3. To provide a circulation and accessibility pattern 
which will allow adequate access and visibility to 
businesses. 
4. To limit city acquisition and relocation of existing 
businesses and uses in the area to an absolute mini- 
mum. 
5. To provide opportunities and options for private de- 
velopment to "package" redevelopment parcels to 
accommodate one or more business uses. 
6. To identify the financing mechanisms available to 
businesses for redevelopment/relocation. 
7. To encourage an architectural character and quality 
to buildings and amenities to give the overall area 
the image of continuity and attractiveness. 
The Plan's guidelines defined considerations in vehicular circulation, pedes- 
trian circulation, land use patterns, and design aspects. It also recommended 
potential changes to be made in the text of the Zoning Ordinance which would 
promote better and more efficient land use and provide incentives for private 
development and businesses to locate in the area. Some of these suggestions 
included: 
I. reduction in setbacks; 
2. increase in percentage of site coverage; 
3. expansion of land use activities without con- 
ditional use permits; 
4. reduction in off-site parking requirements; and 
5. decrease in lot size and area limitations. 
In addition, the creation of a Redevelopment District Overlay zone was recom- 
mended. Such an overlay district would allow for the use of the current zoning 
and zoning regulations while creating incentives to develop the area in a more 
efficient manner and which would allow for a higher density pattern conducive 
to the character, pattern and "texture" of the CBD. The district would make 
special consideration of: 
* reduced building setbacks; 
* reduction in off-street parking in the case of 
collective parking and based on the number of 
businesses and their area; 
* increase in site coverage; 
* additional permitted uses including 
- senior centers, community and/or recreation 
centers, 
- YMCA, YWCA, 
- churches, chapels, temples, and synagogues; and 
* minimum lot size requirements. 
The submission of the application for UDAG monies was postponed until August. 
The election three months earlier of President Reagan created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty about the availability of funds, continuation of the program at 
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the federal level, and the feasibility of the redevelopment project without 
UDAG funding. At their February meeting, DRAB "agreed that Downtown Redevel- 
opment (was an important project whether or not UDAG funding (could be ob- 
tained." (DRAB Minutes, February 18, 1982) 
The status of the UDAG funding was a source of anxiety through the early 
spring of 1981. This is reflected in a series of Manhattan Mercury headlines 
on three consecutive days: 
2-17-81: "UDAG Hopes Drooping" 
2-18-81: "City's Yo-Yo UDAG Hopes Rebound Again" 
2-19-81: "City Still Unsure; Post Freeze Thawed" 
In an effort to regain some semblance of stability in the process, several 
City representatives traveled to Washington in "an effort to clear up ques- 
tions about what effect President Reagan's budget cut proposals might have 
on the City's future plans, especially the downtown redevelopment project." 
(Manhattan Mercury, February 23, 1981) That trip raised hopes again, but 
instilled a feeling of urgency. It was decided that a May, 1981, application 
would be more appropriate than August. One month later, for two reasons, the 
date was again set in August. First, the developer had not yet obtained the 
necessary commitments from department stores needed to complete the application. 
Second, President Reagan had extended the UDAG program for at least one more 
year, thus reducing, to some degree, the urgency of applying. 
Another traumatic series of events occurred that spring. That was the cam- 
paign and election of City Commissioners. There were several "anti-downtown- 
ers" campaigning for the three seats available. Three of the six primary 
election victors were staunch opponents of the redevelopment. Their objectives 
were primarily: 
* that the City should not interfere with the free 
market system; 
* that the project was bound to produce "hidden costs" 
which would be paid by the citizens and which were 
not being disclosed by City officials and staff; and 
* that citizens had the right to vote on the mall in a 
referendum. 
After the primary election, a surprised DRAB concluded that "information about 
downtown was not reaching a large portion of the citizens." They "spent the 
bulk of their meeting time discussing possible ways of becoming more active 
in informing the public about the revitalization project -- primarily about 
what they said were misconceptions arising during the election." (Manhattan 
Mercury, March 11, 1981) 
A more aggressive approach was taken by members of the Commission. Three Com- 
missioners organized the Concerned Citizens for Manhattan, or, as it was called 
in the newspaper, the "Truth Squad." The group of citizens prepared literature, 
wrote letters to the editor, and placed pro-downtown redevelopment ads in the 
newspaper during the commission campaign. The issue was so heated that the 
Mercury described the atmosphere on April 5 as: 
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"a bubbling cauldron of barely contained passions for 
nearly a month, frothed almost uncontrollably Saturday, 
amid a fresh round of charges and countercharges leveled 
only two days prior to the election." 
The result of the election was that two of the three seats were won by pro- 
redevelopment candidates, one an incumbent. The third was won by one of 
the anti-redevelopment campaigners. Had two of the seats gone to anti-mall 
candidates, continuation of the project would have been impossible. Several 
essential future votes, such as approval of funding sources and condemnation 
of properties, would require support from four of the five Commissioners. 
During all of this, other aspects of the process continued. The Downtown 
Design Project held its first workshop to begin development of guidelines 
toward a historic district and coordination with a possible commercial re- 
habilitation loan program to implement the guidelines. 
An Office Market Analysis had been contracted for and completed. This study 
analyzed and confirmed the feasibility of a west-end office complex in down- 
town. Athena Tacha, the designated artist should the NEA Arts -in Public 
Places grant be approved, visited with City staff and members of the Down- 
town Design Project to assure a design compatible with her eventual public 
art. Several of the recommendations made in the CBD - Southside Redevelopment 
Plan were instituted. Zoning text changes were made and overlay district was 
created as suggested. 
Finally, the possibility of another funding source was being explored. This 
was the use of tax-exempt bonds which could be used to set up a loan fund to 
be administered through local banks, a Commercial Rehabilitation Loan Program. 
Summer, 1981 
In May of 1981, background work and research had been completed to the extent 
that a Commercial Rehabilitation Loan Program could be set up. In this pro- 
gram, 
"Tax exempt bonds (would) be issued by the City and the 
money...loaned to local financial institutions. These 
funds are then loaned to property and storeowners for 
rehabilitation. Loans may also be made to merchants 
who wish to buy their building in order to rehabilita- 
tion." 
(DRAB Minutes, May 13, 1981) 
The issuance of the loans would be tied to compliance with other aspects of 
the process. 
"Stith noted that persons who wish to qualify for these 
loans must upgrade their facades within the guidelines 
established by the Downtown Design Project. Coupled 
with this is the Historic District, which can provide 
further incentives for rehabilitation through tax bene- 
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fits... These two programs will bring about the first 
visible physical improvements in the area." 
(DRAB Minutes, May 13, 1981) 
Three types of loans would be available through the program. These were: 
* landlord improvement loans; 
* first mortgage rehabilitation loans; and 
* leasehold improvement loans. 
In July, the City Commission passed a Resolution of Intent to issue the bonds. 
Because of the high interest rates, however, it was April of 1982 before an 
ordinance authorizing the issuance was passed. Even so "owners (could) pro- 
ceed...at their own risk and later make use of the loan money when it is 
available." (DRAB Minutes, July 22, 1981) 
Public hearings were held in July for the August submission of the UDAG appli- 
cation. The request was for $11,500,000 in federal funds to be combined with 
$52,556,000 private, local and other funds for a total redevelopment budget of 
$64,056,000. 
The proposal consisted of six facets or, in the language of the grant, 
"transactions." (See Plate 14) These were: 
1. The development of a 9 block area to include an 
enclosed regional shopping mall and associated 
parking facilities east of Third Street, both 
north and south of Poyntz Avenue. 
2. The development of an office building by Steel 
and Pipe Supply Company and other office space 
on the west side of Third Street, north of 
Leavenworth. 
3. The development of condominium office facilities 
on the north side of Poyntz Avenue in the 500 
block. 
4. The development of service commercial space lo- 
cated on the north and south sides of the 300 block 
of Colorado Street. 
5. The development of office facilities and associated 
parking on the south side of Poyntz Avenue in the 
500 block. 
6. The rehabilitation of existing commercial structures 
with required facade improvements in an area bounded 
by Third Street, the alley south of Houston Street, 
Fifth Street, and Humboldt Street. 
The developer still had not gotten commitments from the required two depart- 
ment stores. One commitment, from J.C. Penneys, was unofficially assured 
upon condition that a second store's commitment was attained. 
Efforts were strongest in attempting to convince the Sears and Roebuck Com- 
pany to join as the second store. There were two reasons for this. First, 
Sears already had a store operating in downtown Manhattan and, according to 
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the YES Plan, was, along with the Penneys store, one of the major retail 
attractions to the CBD. 
Second, J.C. Penneys' management had given the indication that it preferred 
to go into the mall with Sears as the second "major." Apparently, in their 
experience, they felt that the Penneys-Sears combination was the most compati- 
ble and desirable. A problem was that after a national reorganization, Man- 
hattan was included in the Sears region based in Chicago. That region was 
not emphasizing retail expansion and was concentrating on financial invest- 
ments. The Chicago headquarters had not been scheduled to oversee any retail 
expansion in their five-year plan. 
Also in July, the City announced that its NEA request for an Art in Public 
Places grant had been denied. However, a letter of intent to apply for a 
grant in the 1982 round had been submitted to NEA. "Athena Tacha will work 
with the Design Team to prepare preliminary designs which will be submitted 
with the next grant application." (DRAB Minutes, July 22, 1981) 
An interesting event which also occurred that summer was a rezoning request 
made by a property owner outside of the City limits. The site had been chosen 
by the Dial Corporation of Omaha, Nebraska, as a possible location for a shop- 
ping mall. 
The request was denied for a number of reasons: 
* the site was partially in the flood plain; 
* highway access was not considered adequate; 
* the site's proximity to the airport. 
In addition, the City Planning staff, in its staff report to the Planning 
Board, analyzed the request in accordance with the criteria established by the 
courts in the Golden case. The result was a recommendation by the Planning 
Board and a decision by the County Commission that the request by denied. 
By August, the Downtown Design Project had completed three storefront designs 
and was in the process of completing seven others. It also continued work on 
streetscape designs and on assisting the Historic District Review Board in 
creating an Historic District in the downtown area. 
Fall & Winter, 1981 
In September, the Downtown Redevelopment Plan was completed and adopted. This 
plan was required by State statute to create a Tax Increment Financing District. 
The goal of the plan was to eliminate the blighted conditions described in the 
TIF Eligibility Report. The project described to be implemented in order to 
alleviate those conditions was the same as that described in the UDAG applica- 
tion. It also integrated many of the objectives and design considerations 
recommended in the YES Plan. 
Besides being in compliance with this CBD Land Use Element, the Redevelopment 
Plan included: 
* a summary of the feasibility study; 
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* a description and map of the project area; 
* a relocation assistance plan; 
* a description of proposed buildings and facilities; 
and 
* other information deemed necessary. 
In addition, the plan described the: 
* general project description; 
* overall program objectives of the Redevelopment Plan; 
* general land use plan; 
* general building requirements and objectives; 
* summary of economic feasibility; 
* relationship to local objectives; 
* redevelopment activities (including relocation 
assistance plan); 
* procedures for amending the plan; and 
* summary of financial feasibility. 
That finished, all of the pieces of the puzzle were as completed as possible. 
Word was received in October and again in January, 1982, the HUD had "rolled- 
over" the UDAG request. It considered the project viable but also considered 
the application incomplete without the department store commitments and re- 
tained the application for consideration in the succeeding quarter. 
The Commercial Rehabilitation Loan Program had begun even though bonds were 
to be issued. DRAB was told in December that "a number of storeowners are 
ready to make improvements and are waiting for the loan money to become avail- 
able." (DRAB Minutes, December 2, 1981) 
The Manhattan Credit Bureau became the first business to complete facade im- 
provements under the redevelopment guidelines. The work was coordinated with 
the RTKL architect and Athena Tacha. 
In December, 1981, the City Commission appropriated funds to continue the 
Downtown Design Project until the end of 1982. Through a contract with the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Design Project would provide design assistance, in- 
sure design coordination, and provide information about the incentives avail- 
able for the rehabilitation of older commercial buildings. 
Also in December, the Commission held public hearings on establishing a Busi- 
ness Improvement District in the downtown. The purpose of the district would 
be to provide services which exceed those supplied by the City and would pro- 
mote or restore the economic vitality of the district and the city. Services 
which could be provided include beautification, security, maintenance, promo- 
tion and special public services, such as restrooms. 
Briefly, a committee appointed by the Commission develops preliminary plans 
for the establishment and operation of the district. If the committee con- 
cludes that the district should be created, it submits a report to the Commis- 
sion defining the district's boundaries, services needed within the area, 
and cost estimates. After holding a public hearing on the creation of an 
improvement district. If the Commissioners approve its establishment, they 
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will appoint an Advisory Board made up of representatives of businesses with- 
in the district. Each year the Advisory Board will submit to the Commission 
a recommended program of services to be provided within the district and a 
proposed budget to accomplish these objectives. 
Based on that proposed budget, the Commission will collect improvement ser- 
vice fees from the businesses in the improvement district. The amount of 
each business' fee may be based on a variety of factors: 
* building square footage; 
* land area; 
* number of employees. 
Once the fees are collected, they will be placed into a special fund to be 
used to provide services only within the district. 
The Result 
The result of these several years of effort is a complex interrelationship of 
public and private ventures. The City's major involvement was in the creation 
of a trilogy of basic activities. (See Plate 15) These were: 
1. a regional shopping mall at the east end of Poyntz; 
2. an area of conservation and rehabilitation west of 
the mall site; and 
3. an area at the west end of the redevelopment area 
for two office building developments. 
The enclosed shopping mall and associated parking will involve approximately 
31 acres. (See Plate 16) The mall itself would occupy approximately 410,000 
square feet, 190,000 of which would be three major department stores. Addi- 
tional space is available at the east end of the site in the event of a possi- 
ble second phase expansion which would add a fourth major department store. 
This addition would bring the total retail space to 500,000 square feet. The 
impact of this development is expected to encourage the revitalization of 
other CBD facilities. In addition, completion of this aspect of the plan will 
meet these objectives: 
* Encourage the development of a retail shopping complex 
in an enclosed mall in the CBD area with three depart- 
ment stores. 
* Promote the development of public facilities and activ- 
ities in the CBD area. 
* Emphasize and add to the existing cluster of public and 
semi-public and government uses in the CBD. 
* Encourage the clustering of mixed use activities to 
promote multi-purpose trips to the CBD and to strengthen 
its image as an "action" place. 
* Promote activities in the CBD which will make it a 
seven-days-a-week, 16-hours-a-day center. 
* Relocate uses from the core of the CBD which are not 
compatible with pedestrians, local traffic, housing or 
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retail facilities, i.e., warehousing, manufacturing, 
materials processing, automobile sales and service, 
generators of truck traffic, etc. 
* Maximize the utilization of the public and private in- 
vestment already concentrated in the CBD. 
The public sector will be involved with this part of the redevelopment through 
these activities: 
* site preparation; 
* vacation of all streets and public right-of-ways with- 
in the site area; 
* provision of certain off-site improvements needed to 
accommodate the development (Southern Arterial, drain- 
age improvements, connection of Leavenworth to Tuttle 
Creek Boulevard for traffic routing, relocation of 
sewer and water mains); 
* disposition of land for shopping mall construction; 
* lease land for parking facilities to developer; 
* acquisition of buildings, improvements, and land 
in the shopping mall site; 
* relocation of site occupants; 
* clearance of all existing improvements; 
* relocation of the Union Pacific Marshalling Yards; 
* development of a Southern Arterial; 
* development of a public plaza; and 
* streetscapes and beautification of the four square 
block area immediately west of the shopping center 
mall to help integrate the existing retailing area 
and the shopping mall. 
The private sector, in this case the mall developer, will be responsible for 
the: 
* acquisition of 500,000 square feet of land from the 
City for the shopping mall site; 
* construction of a single level shopping center con- 
taining three major department stores; 
* construction of retail space and common area for 
the shopping mall; 
* leasing of space to retailers; 
* leasing of land for parking facilities from the City; 
* participation to benefit districts for area improve- 
ments; and 
continue to own, operate, and manage the shopping mall. 
The second major aspect of the redevelopment project was the rehabilitation 
of existing commercial structures in a six square block area in the core of 
the Central Business District. (See PLATE 17) This activity was included 
for two major reasons. The development of the regional mall to the east of 
this area required assurances that: 
1. the new development be physically integrated with 
the existing area of the city; and 
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2. the general environment of the CBD must be en- 
hanced in such a way so as to preserve its unique 
character. 
"Emphasis must be placed on improving the environment that 
exists between the two significant areas of development. 
This will not only create an integrated visual order be- 
tween old and new, but, more importantly, revitalize and 
make a viable and active CBD shopping area for Manhattan." 
(Redevelopment Plan, p.17) 
The focus of the activities would be technical design assistance for: 
* streetscape design; 
* facade improvements; 
* cultural plaza design. 
Specifically, the City intends to meet these objectives through this aspect 
of the project: 
* to establish detailed urban design criteria on a 
block-by-block basis; 
* to direct attention to a program of facade improve- 
ments and preservation; 
* to establish a design review process for development 
in the CBD; 
* to encourage adaptive reuse of buildings that are 
well lOcated and structurally sound but lack a strong 
market for their original use; 
* to promote the understanding of Poyntz Avenue as the 
"main street" for Manhattan; 
* to encourage the revitalization of the buildings 
along Poyntz Avenue; 
* to develop an environment which invites and encourages 
both spontaneous and planned cultural and recreational 
opportunities; 
* to promote the "pedestrianization" of Poyntz Avenue; 
* to conserve, restore and revitalize the historical 
character of the buildings along Poyntz Avenue; 
* to provide an opportunity for public and private 
joint development efforts; and 
* to reconfirm, strengthen and encourage new and re- 
habilitated housing in the residential neighborhoods 
to the west and north of the CBD. 
The public sector will be involved by undertaking the following activities: 
* Establish a commercial rehabilitation loan program 
through local lending institutions using industrial 
revenue bonds as a "loan to lenders." 
* Develop design guidelines for required facade im- 
provements through a Design Demonstration Project 
funded by the National Endowment for the Arts. The 
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Design Guidelines will conform to the Secretary of 
Interior's guidelines for historic preservation. 
* Design and construct streetscape improvements from 
Third Street to Sixth Street along Poyntz Avenue 
and intervening side streets. 
* Develop parking facilities in the west end of the 
CBD in conjunction with SITE 5. 
* Establish an historic district to preserve the his- 
toric and cultural assets of the Conservation Area 
and provide tax incentives for historic preservation 
and rehabilitation of structures. 
* Use Mortgage Subsidy Bonds to establish a residential 
rehabilitation loan program in conjunction with the 
Community Development Rehabilitation Program. 
The private sector will be involved by taking advantage of the loan programs 
and tax incentives, by following the design guidelines, and by "working in 
concert with the City to improve the quality of the structures in this area." 
(Redevelopment Plan, p.20) 
The third major aspect of the Downtown Redevelopment Project is the West End 
Office Complex. It is considered an important element for several reasons. 
"It will improve the visual aspects of this entrance to 
the CBD. In addition, it will provide a significant 
activity center on the west end of the CBD to anchor 
the area and create a secondary activity center to at- 
tract people through the core of the CBD, thus strength- 
ening the conservation area between the two activity 
centers." 
(Redevelopment Plan, p.20) 
It would be the construction of two office buildings. One will be a 22,000 
square foot condominium office development on the north side of Poyntz Avenue. 
The other would be a 45,000 square foot building which, along with associated 
parking, will be located on the south side of Poyntz Avenue. (See Plate 18) 
By becoming involved with this development, the City will address these ob- 
jectives: 
* to bring more employees and shoppers into the down- 
town area during the day; 
* to create more parking space for overflow of commer- 
cial activities; 
* to create a visual anchor on the west end of the 
downtown district. 
In order to meet these objectives, the City will take these steps: 
* acquisition of three buildings on 97,500 square feet 
of land in the 500 block between Poyntz Avenue and 
Houston Street; 
* relocation of site occupants; 
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* clearance of existing improvements; 
* site preparation; 
* disposition of 65,250 square feet of land for 
office building construction on two sites north 
and south of Poyntz Avenue; 
* development of parking facilities on the south 
half of Site 5 through a benefit district. 
The private sector's involvement will be reflected in the following ways: 
* acquisition of the land from the City; 
* construction of the buildings; 
* leasing of the space to office uses; and 
* participating in benefit districts for the area 
improvements. 
These are already commitments by private contractors to undertake this part 
of the project. Their participation, however, is dependent upon the approval 
of the UDAG application. 
In addition to these three major development areas, there are two related pri- 
vate developments. One is the Southside Redevelopment Area. The property is 
already owned by the City, making the public sector's responsibilities: 
* disposition of the land; 
* providing financial assistance through Industrial 
Revenue Bonds, if requested. 
The private sector's portion will include: 
* acquisition of the property from the City; 
* construction of 50,000 square feet of service 
commercial space; and 
* leasing of the space to service commercial businesses 
with emphasis on businesses displaced by the shopping 
mall. 
The other is the construction of the Steel and Pipe Supply Company Office 
Building. This is to be a 50,000 square foot office building to house one 
of Manhattan's major industries. The City's activities supporting this pro- 
ject would be: 
* approval of rezoning the site to either Central 
Business District or Restricted Business District 
as requested. These are the uses designated for 
the site in the Land Use Plan; 
* provide, if requested, financial assistance through 
Industrial Revenue Bonds; 
* provided relocation assistance to the occupant of 
the existing building through sale of industrial site 
in the City industrial park if requested. 
The private developer will: 
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* construct a five story, 50,000 square foot office 
building to house the home office of Steel and Pipe 
Supply Company and rental office space; 
* construct a 150 space parking lot; 
* lease 25,000 square feet of office space. 
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Introduction 
In some small ways, the downtown redevelopment in Manhattan has begun. How- 
ever, the element which will determine the function of the CBD, the shopping 
mall, is not yet a certainty. The UDAG funding cannot be approved until and 
unless at least two department stores are officially committed to the project. 
Therefore, it is not possible to evaluate the results of the decisions and 
the process yet. 
It is possible, though, to examine and review the planning process in an 
academic way and to analyze the factors which entered into the process. It 
is also possible to examine several problems and obstacles which have been 
recognized and dealt with throughout the project. 
This chapter will review a variety of factors which impacted on the redevelop- 
ment. First, the process itself will be analyzed and compared to several plan- 
ning procedure guides. Second, some of the choices and influences which di- 
rectly impacted on the development will be examined. Third, some of the 
problems which arose will be described and fourth, the impact of this process 
on the planning process of the entire city will be reviewed. Finally, sev- 
eral conclusions and recommendations will be offered. 
The Process 
A number of guides can be found which describes the planning process. This 
report used The Process of Urbanization, a series of six monographs prepared 
by Kansas State University "to help Kansas communities solve their problems 
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through comprehensive community planning." The sixth monograph in this series 
is "The Planning Process" by Ray Weisenburger, Assistant Professor of Archi- 
tecture and Planning at Kansas State University. Page 16 of that report is a 
diagram showing the steps of the planning process. (See Plate 19) 
In Manhattan, the YES Plan, the Feasibility Study, accomplished steps one and 
two. The Commission wanted to judge the reasonableness of the goal to preserve 
the CBD and to be presented with alternatives. The consultants complied by 
gathering and interpreting information on the existing community. For every 
plan later prepared, step one was considered completed. Step two was consid- 
ered completed for the CBD Land Use Element of the Land Use Plan and also for 
the Redevelopment Plan. The documents were direct decendents of the YES Plan 
and were the documents with which all other aspects of the project must comply. 
Because of the specific nature of the Tax Increment Financing Eligibility Re- 
port and the Southside Redevelopment Plan, these started with step two and 
followed each of the remaining steps in order. 
Beyond the basic process are several other interesting aspects. For example, 
although it was required that the CBD Land Use Element be approved before Tax 
Increment Financing could be instituted, it was prepared at the same time as 
the TIF Eligibility Report. While each plan was prepared individually accord- 
ing to the accepted procedure, each was prepared as staff was able and avail- 
able rather than strictly according to chronological need. The Redevelopment 
Plan was completed after the TIF Report even though it was required before the 
former could be adopted. In the long run, the order of completing the plans 
was not important. The order of approval by the Commission was. 
Besides reviewing the basic planning process and procedures, an analysis of 
Manhattan's redevelopment as compared to guidelines for that specific type of 
project would be useful. Just as with the planning process, there is a variety 
of sources which offer guidelines for CBD redevelopment projects. The one used 
in this analysis was prepared by C.A. Keithley, Professor of Regional and Com- 
munity Planning at Kansas State University. His guidelines were developed as 
the result of attending a DUG Conference in November of 1978 on Rebuilding 
Downtowns. 
According to Keithley, eleven necessary ingredients in successfully redevelop- 
ing a downtown are: 
1. Stop Dreaming: ascertain the realities and educate decision-makers 
as to costs and benefits of various developmental possiblities. Un- 
derstand own problems, constraints, market and market potential, and 
establish realistic goals to which everyone subscribes. 
2. Get good community leaders elected, and then retained in office for 
longer period of time. (It is impossible to accomplish anything in 
two years.) 
3. Develop a strong merchants organization, willing to invest more than 
time and talk in a commitment to community development. 
4. Develop a partnership between the city and the downtown developer. 
The city must be willing to invest and help the developer over stumb- 
ling blocks such as zoning, etc. 
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STEP ONE 
STEP TWO 
STEP THREE 
STEP FOUR 
STEP FIVE 
STEP SIX 
Develop preliminary 
community goals and 
objectives 
- -II 
Complete a 
community survey 
Analyze the urvey material 
Refine community goals 
and objectives 
Prepare the comprehensive 
community development 
plan 
Devise implementation 
techniques and instruments 
to carry out the comprehen- 
sive community development 
plan 
Establish a continuing 
planning program. 
PLATE 19 
The planning commission determines 
where they are and where they want 
to go. 
Information is collected on the exist- 
ing community. The data should cover 
land capability, natural resources, 
economic base, population, land use, 
transportation and circulation, com- 
munity facilities, recreation facilities, 
public utilities, housing conditions, 
neighborhood problems, central 
business district conditions and visual 
environment. 
The data collected in Step Two is 
analyzed by the planner. Forecasts 
of future conditions are prepared. 
Now that the planning commission 
has had an opportunity to look at the 
analysis of the data on the commun- 
ty as it is and is expected to be, the 
goals and objectives developed in 
Step One should be adapted for 
realistic feasibility. 
. 
Plans for physical development of 
land, transportation and circulation 
facilities, recreation facilities, 
public utilities, central area, and 
the visual environment are prepared. 
PREPARING THE COMPREHENSIVE 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
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The planner prepares an official 
map, a zoning ordinance, sub- 
division regulations, and the capital 
improvement program. He also 
determines which Federal aid 
programs can be effectively 
employed. 
5. Obtain professional planning and design assistance to evaluate the 
alternatives. Focus on assets and capitalize on what exists. 
6. Develop community support by actively involving the public/community 
in the design of the plan. (Designer/Planner as catalyst, i.e. Edmond 
Bacon Planning Process.) 
7. Implement the Plan: This usually requires heavy public spending as an 
inducement for private investment. (Talk is poor substitute for action.) 
8. Develop an image of the city on the move. (It is doubtful that any 
CBD can turn around its image, regionally, by incrementally renovating 
individual buildings/storefronts. Something big, with impact, must 
be done! An image must be developed!) 
9. Total orientation of all public decisions to CBD enhancement, i.e. 
zoning, building permits, housing construction, etc. Rebuild the 
Periphery of the CBD and make integral with the renovation of down- 
town. 
10. Think of Downtown as a shopping center which needs professional mana- 
gerial personnel, who acts for all of the CBD and who can promote the 
CBD as though it were a single unified shopping center. Embodied 
here is the avoidance of sub-optimization of individual interests. 
11. Develop a good access, parking and transportation linkages for auto 
as well as pedestrian. Parking in the wrong location can destroy the 
effort. You must get people from their cars to pedestrian spaces 
without going through department stores. A driver of an automobile 
is not a shopper until he/she is extracted from his/her car and be- 
comes a pedestrian. 
Manhattan was very successful to moderately successful in meeting most of 
these criteria, but was not very successful in a few. 
The city was very successful in understanding its problems. The Commissioners 
in general were very interested in creating a modern, progressive city with 
modern, progressive facilities. In 1978, one of the Commissioners was a 
banker who understood the monetary and marketing aspects of the process. He 
was well informed both personally and professionally, from an established 
Manhattan family, and was well liked. His opinions were respected. Another 
Commissioner had, for a time, been the City Attorney. Another had lived in 
Manhattan for decades and had served on the Commission longer than any other 
person in the City's history. They were convinced that the redevelopment was 
in the best interest of the City and they supported it. 
With the exception of the one anti-mall Commissioner who refuses to become 
educated on the subject, the elected officials are well informed and have 
a good understanding of the subject. They also represent the broadest base 
of the public's support. The anti-mall Commissioner had only one campaign 
contributor outside of her family. That contributor is a Manhattan developer 
who does not own property in the CBD and will not benefit by the redevelopment 
nor is he eligible to use the incentive tools developed during the project 
planning. 
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The City's success in developing a strong merchants organization was mixed. 
The members of Downtown, Inc. and the Downtown Redevelopment Committee had 
solicited City Commission help for downtown redevelopment and had acted as 
an organized force in defeating outlying mall rezonings. Presently, however, 
the Downtown, Inc. is not as well organized nor as active as it had been in 
the past. Even so, individual members are. This may be the result of the 
rapidity and complexity of the redevelopment process. It may also be that 
the City's active role, especially that of the staff, has deminished the 
drive that individual members and the organizations had at one time. 
The partnership between the City and the developer is excellent. In fact, the 
developer has described the relationship as "impecable." Forest City has in- 
cluded many local design and policy aspects into the site plans which could 
have been ignored. The City has included in its process tools, such as UDAG 
and IRB's, which will ease cost constraints and design requirements to reduce 
burdens imposed by developing in the CBD. There is weekly telephone contact 
between Roebuck and Stith. It should be added, though, that by the Spring of 
1982, several Commissioners had expressed concerns about the length of time 
required for the development process. Even so, Roebuck could speak frankly 
and convincingly in calming most fears. 
Professional planning and design assistance was easily and readily available 
because of the resources at Kansas State University. If it could be said 
that there was a problem in this area, it would be that there was too much 
free advice from students and faculty in planning and architecture. In addi- 
tion to this was the assistance from RTKL and the Design Project. 
The success of the City in involving the public and community in the design 
of the plan was moderate. There was a variety of reasons for this. As dis- 
cussed in Chapter 3, most public input was given at public hearings by communi- 
ty organization leaders. There was no constant, consistant interest of the 
public in general. The general public rarely offered relevant input. On the 
other hand, when the April, 1981, open meeting was held to review the mall 
site plans, several hundred persons attended. Public interest was spratic 
and simplistic. 
The Downtown Design Project did involve a greater level of public input than 
the project in general. This was attained at the public design workshops 
, which were attended by the public in general and by downtown merchants and 
property owners. Perhaps the reasons for this higher level of public response 
were: 
* the more specific nature of that redevelopment 
component; 
* the fact that the design project had offices in 
the CBD and were more familiar to the public in- 
volved; 
* the faster, more direct impact on the Project had 
as contrasted to the overall redevelopment process; 
* more effective public information than the process 
in general. 
Implementing the plan and developing "an image of the City on the move" can 
not begin until financial and administrative commitments are obtained for 
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the mall. The feeling so far is that the full impact of the plan cannot be 
realized until the decision regarding the UDAG application is made. Other 
accomplishments seem less dramatic. 
Finally, Manhattan met the last three criteria moderately well. Rezonings in 
and around the CBD have been made based on the Redevelopment Plan, the South- 
side Redevelopment Plan, and the redevelopment goals and guidelines in general. 
The promotion of the CBD as a single entity has begun with the establishment 
of the BID, but is still in its infancy. Once the funding is secured and the 
large-scaled aspects of the projects have begun, the access, parking, and 
transportation linkages will be constructed. The designs developed by the 
City and by the developer's consultant were coordinated and intend to meet 
the needs and goals of both the public and private sectors as well as the 
pedestrian consumer. 
Choices and Influences 
Many of the decisions which were made were based on and shaped by local values 
and priorities. Others were dictated by the Federal government, particularly 
by HUD, in their funding requirements and regulations. Aspects of each of 
these will be reviewed and examined. 
Before completion of the YES Plan, support for the preserving the CBD had 
been based on a vague perception that displacement of the City's retail core 
would not be in the best interest of the community. Although not documented, 
there was a large segment of the population that liked the character of the 
City with a central downtown district typical of small midwestern communities. 
It is probably safe to say that there was also a large segment of the communi- 
ty that wanted to have a shopping mall but really did not care whether it was 
in the CBD or on the urban fringe. The YES Plan put into writing the design 
concepts and aspects that most people seemed to recognize yet were unable to 
express. These were: 
* the historical aspects such as the importance of the 
river, the grid pattern of the downtown streets, the 
importance of the existance of many trees and of Poyntz 
as the "Main Street;" 
* the social factors including major issues such as cir- 
culation and parking, downtown business operations and 
the image of the downtown; and 
* the economic context including information on lost 
sales and the potential for retail expansion. 
When developing the project, these aspects were integrated into the designs. 
There were discussions about the reasonableness of having the mall block 
Poyntz east of Third Street. It would interrupt the view of the riverbank 
and trees and destroy part of "Main Street." The use of native materials 
was encouraged to establish continuity with the areas surrounding the mall 
site. These were considerations of the City's traffic study, the developer's 
traffic study, the guidelines for the historic district, and the mall de- 
sign. When preparing the Southside Redevelopment Plan, 
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"Members of the Board agreed that as the Design Group 
study had indicated, the grid system plays an important 
part in the character of the area, a character which 
should be maintained through the redevelopment process." 
(DRAB Minutes, May 13, 1981) 
It should be realized that the design concepts were defined by architects and 
designers. Their perspectives and priorities are different from those of the 
lay citizen. For instance, it is doubtful that "the importance of the river" 
was an idea held by most of the population. It was not visible or accessible 
from the downtown because of the levee built in the early 1950's for flood 
control. 
Impact on City Planning 
The process of planning for the downtown redevelopment had an impact on the 
planning tools and policies used throughout the City. Three examples of this 
are: 
* reviewing and updating the Commercial Element of 
the Land Use Plan; 
* establishing a Growth Guidance Policy; and 
* reviewing specific zoning regulations such as 
those for the Planned Development District (PDD). 
After the rezoning request made by SBL and Landmark in the late 1970's, the 
City Commission had directed staff to review each of these tools and to im- 
prove upon those which existed. Review of the Commercial Element was needed 
to examine the types and amounts of commercial activities already in the City 
to determine the best method of commercial expansion. The Growth Guidance 
Policy was needed to control growth in such a way that the CBD would not be- 
come less central. The PDD regulations were made more specific in an attempt 
to disallow its use as a circumvention of the zoning regulations. 
Opposition 
The predominant feelings of the public toward the redevelopment were support 
or indifference. Opposition had come from developers who would not benefit, 
merchants who would be relocated, and the ever-present cynics who, regardless 
of the situation, would think the plan had no chance of success. Never had 
there been any statement or presentation made which was a legitimate or perti- 
nent to the decision-making process. It was heresay, opinion, emotion, or 
not salient. That is not to say, though, that had reasonable opposition been 
made during the early debates, the outcome would have remained the same. 
The opposition was not an organized effort. The developers spoke only if a 
particular issue directly impacted on his project, such as with the John's 
tract rezoning requests. They spoke in support of their own requests, but 
not in opposition to redeveloping the downtown. The merchant's opposition 
was emotionally based and was more concerned with relocation and adequate 
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compensation than with policies and procedures. The cynics expressed their 
opinions at private parties rather than at public meetings. Everyone seemed 
to have an opinion;, some were critical of the project. However, opposition 
was not expressed through official or appropriate means. 
During the 1981 Commission elections, however, the first organized opposition 
to the project began. The Westside Homeowner's Association was created and 
supported the three anti-mall candidates. They espoused three main concerns: 
* that there were "hidden costs to the development that 
were not being explained to the public; 
* that the government should not interfere with the 
free market system by making a downtown development 
as financially feasible as an outlying development; and 
* that the decision to have a downtown development should 
be made in a referendum election. 
The evidence given by the group as support of their statements was not fact- 
ually sound. Their reports of the uses of funds was inaccurate and misleading. 
For example, the group stated that no monies were being allocated to the relo- 
cation of businesses when in fact part of the UDAG funding would be used for 
exactly that. If the project will result in hidden costs, it has yet to be 
discovered by City staff. Even if some unforeseen costs result, it is assumed 
that it will be more than compensated by increased property and sales tax re- 
turns 
The interference of the government in the market system is a common complaint 
regardless of the magnitude of the project. The government's role in this case 
was contrasted to a "do nothing" process which was not seen as being in the 
best interest of the City's environmental, social, and economic wellbeing. 
Given that alternative, the City was well within its purview in exercising 
certain powers to develop the project. In fact, it could be said that any 
other decision would have been neglect on the part of the Commission to pro- 
tect the public's health, safety, and general welfare. 
Regarding the insistance that a decision on the project be made through a ref- 
erendum, several points should be made. First, there were no issues or elements 
in the project which would require such a vote. Adoption of all plans, includ- 
ing the 1969 Land Use Plan and the YES Plan which established maintaining the 
CBD as the regional shopping area, had included public input at public hearings 
and during public opinion surveys. The same was true of all grant applications. 
What is even more pertinent was the underlying reasons for the group's opposi- 
tion. In complying with HUD's requirement of meeting its locally determined 
public housing needs, the City had allowed for the construction of a public 
housing project on the west side of the City. It was this which was the Home- 
owners Association's real complaint. They objected to what seemed to be Hud's 
forcing the City to establish a project which they were not convinced was need- 
ed. Neither did they feel downtown redevelopment should be gained through 
what they felt was the degradation of their neighborhood. Downtown redevelop- 
ment was a symbol of current government policies. The Homeowner's Association 
thought opposition to that project was a way to combat the public housing issue. 
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Public Information 
By far the weakest link in Manhattan's attempts was its public information 
system. The importance of effective communications was recognized early in 
the process. It was one of the first items considered by DRAB. It was also 
a major point of concern during the Commission election. Yet it was still 
the one aspect of the project which never seemed to be effective. 
The attempts which were made should not be downplayed. A newsletter, "Poyntz 
of Interest," was prepared monthly by the City staff and sent to every busi- 
ness and property owner in the CBD. The local cable television station pre- 
pared a 15 minute local-interest program, also "Poyntz of Interest," twice 
weekly which examined to a certain degree specific issues about the project. 
In addition, Gary Stith was available to schools, clubs, organizations, and 
community education facilities to speak about any or all aspects on the re- 
development project. 
Unfortunately, all of these efforts were not sufficient. The issues indivi- 
dually were very complex. Combined into a total project, the complexity was 
increased exponentially. City staff was not able: 
* to reduce the complexity; 
* to write adequately in the vernacular; or 
* to envision the project in terms of what was 
essential for the public to know. 
In addition, only those persons who had cable TV could receive the television 
show. Consequently, most of the desceminated information was either more than 
the public needed or wanted to know. Much of what they did need or want to 
know was not available. The result was confusion, as in the election, and 
misinterpretation. Staff attitude was also a factor. There was little patience, 
time, or inclination to solve the problem. "It's their fault if they don't 
understand. The information is available. All they have to do is ask" was 
to become the philosophy, especially after an election which instilled a new 
defensiveness in the staff. The availability of a person trained in this area 
would have been a valuable resource. To have hired a part-time journalism 
student or intern would have served the purpose. Someone with the skills, 
abilities and time to devote to doing an adequate job. A specialist was hired 
to do the designing, another to answer traffic engineering questions. This 
aspect, too, should have been afforded the same respect and investment as 
other aspects of the project which were not among the skills contained in 
house. 
It might be well to note, however, that the local newspaper was no more ef- 
fective in reporting on the project. There were several reasons for this. 
First, there was no reporter who covered the issue from its beginning to its 
completion. The result was the reporting by persons who had no concept of 
the history or continuity of the matter. This was also a point stressed by 
the developer. Second, none of the reporters seemed to have an understanding 
of the process or the role of the government. Issues were reported inaccurate- 
ly. Some which were vital to the project received less press than issues which 
took more time at meetings. 
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The Developer's Perspective 
The process motivated by the City had its own goals and methodologies. These 
were sometimes not exactly the same as the goals and methodologies of the de- 
velopers. More than once the City was confronted with this difference and was 
confounded by it each time. Coordinating the two mentalities was as much by 
chance as by design. 
In the City's perception, the timetables were established primarily by grant 
application deadlines and by the general feeling of need to complete the pro- 
ject as quickly as possible. Federal budget cuts and local politics were the 
major sources of this feeling of need. 
In contrast, the developer's timetable was dictated by the economic environment 
of both the nation in general and also the department store chains. Further, 
Roebuck had stated that the normal mall planning may take three to five years 
to complete and Manhattan's is a more complex project than "normal." The in- 
ference is that this project is actually progressing very rapidly. In addi- 
tion, the style of doing business within the private sector is different from 
that within the public sector. Within the private sector, there is apparently 
more nurturing of business relationships over a period of several years. This 
makes sense, however, when one realizes that no business is legally bound to 
cooperate with a developer. Within the public sector, methodologies are more 
quantitative, automatic, bureaucratic, and political. 
Further, it should be noted that the regionalism within private industry does 
not necessarily coincide with that of the public. For example, in the early 
70's, when Sears had publically indicated interest in locating in "suburban" 
Manhattan malls, the City had been part of Sears' Dallas region. That was 
and is a growing area where retail expansion was possible. Since then, how- 
ever, Sears has reorganized at the national level and Manhattan is now part 
of the Chicago region. That region is not encouraging investments in retail 
expansion but rather in capital investments such as insurance and real estate. 
This was one of the primary reasons that the developer had difficulty attain- 
ing any commitment from Sears regarding Manhattan's redevelopment. Had the 
City been within a region which was considered to be growing, the chain's 
mentality would have been different. 
At the February 16, 1982, City Commission meeting, Roebuck indicated that what 
the City perceived to be major problems were not so considered by the developer. 
The local concerns were the decision to be made on the UDAG application and 
the perception that the process was not moving as smoothly or quickly as it 
should. The developer described the major roadblocks as being: 
* "lack of guts" on the part of some people, apparently 
refering to several members of the Commission; 
* time; 
* national economy; 
* local perceptions, primarily that the process 
should be a fast, smooth one; and 
* department stores, which were a reflection of 
the national economy. 
82 
Other Ideas 
As in most analysis, as many new areas for examination have been exposed as 
have been reviewed. There are several aspects of Manhattan's downtown redevel- 
opment process which deserve deeper scrutiny than could be given in this re- 
port. The purposes of such scrutiny should be the same as those of this 
paper: 
* to offer other cities advice; 
* to give Manhattan some feedback; 
* to develop a planning education aid. 
Several specific ideas for further study are given here. Although there are 
probably others, these ideas come immediately to mind. Each is complex enough 
in its own right to serve as the subject of another report. They are: 
* An examination of the potential impacts of 
alternatives to downtown redevelopment. This 
should include a detailed explanation of the pro's 
and con's to and of CBD revitalization, including 
social, economic, political and land use consider- 
ations. 
* An analysis of locational alternatives in Manhattan. 
This should involve the three sites which had made 
rezoning requests -- John's tract, Westloop (SBL) 
and the Dial proposal -- as well as other site 
possibilities such as the City-owned Industrial 
Park. 
* A policy analysis which would examine the appro- 
priateness and consistency in the process, the 
basis of decision making, and conflict of interest. 
* A study of design criteria alternatives with empha- 
sis of the lack of design expertise on staff. 
* An examination of the impact of a poor public in- 
formation system, especially noting: what problems 
could have been avoided; alternate methodologies 
and developments of criteria for the non-communica- 
tions specialist planner. These would be compara- 
ble to the design criteria and planning process 
models which are so readily available. 
* An examination of the process from the developer's 
perspective. 
Should any of these projects be attempted, it should be with the understanding 
that this was a real project. Alternatives and options should be usable in 
reality, not philosophical or utopian. 
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As cities grow, decline and change,_ planning decisions are made which impact 
on the community's character and shape for decades to come. The social values 
reflected by these decisions should be consistant with those of the citizenry. 
One such value being supported to an increasing degree is the maintenance of 
a strong, central retail core. Development and redevelopment which strengthen 
and revitalize central business districts are becoming more desirable than 
those which allow suburban fringe retail development, most often in the form 
of shopping malls. 
To encourage these developments, innovative planning techniques have had to 
be developed. This was necessary to overcome the unique barriers to large- 
scale CBD developments and also because "it is the responsibility of state 
and local government to comprehend the problem and create the circumstances... 
to make downtown the convenient, lively, beautiful, human place it ought to 
be." (Pierce, 1978) 
By 1977, the City of Manhattan, Kansas, had realized that pressures for retail 
development were forcing a decision to be made on precisely this issue. Should 
the development be allowed on the edge of the city or should the CBD be rede- 
veloped? After analyzing a feasibility study to "comprehend the problem," the 
City began a process to "create the circumstances" to preserve its downtown. 
The purpose was twofold. First, the economic viability of the business core 
in the central business district had been declining for fifteen years. Second, 
because of lack of maintenance of many of the old structures in the C80, re- 
habilitation would be necessary for many of them. Redevelopment was believed 
necessary to protect the area from further decline and to assure structural 
improvements. The project came about as a result of a coalition of efforts 
between local business organizations, local civic and community organizations, 
Kansas State University resources and the City of Manhattan. 
Although information is available from a number of sources regarding the 
Downtown Redevelopment Project, no single source exists which clearly, concise- 
ly and completely reviews and explains the planning process used. This report 
will provide that source. This is the case history of Manhattan's Downtown 
Redevelopment Project from 1971, when several rezoning requests sparked the 
City into action, to 1982, when a decision will be made regarding the City's 
application for Urban Development Action Grant funds from the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development. 
This case history of Manhattan's Downtown Redevelopment will be broad in scope 
chronologically, technically, and analytically. 
Chronologically, this paper examines the events of the redevelopment process 
from 1971 up to 1982. The year 1971 was chosen because, as will be shown, 
several rezoning requests beginning at that time created the atmosphere and 
momentum which have maintained the redevelopment plan, process, and proponents 
from then until now. 
Technically, the report first reviews rezoning requests from 1971 to 1978 and 
how they sparked action for redevelopment. Second will be an examination of 
the key actors in the process. These will include citizen's groups, City staff 
members, various governing bodies, and other individuals who, in one way or 
another, made their influence felt. Third, the actual redevelopment process 
will be described chronologically. How and why various factors grew or dimin- 
ished in importance will be examined and strengths and weaknesses of the pro- 
cess will be described. 
Analytically, because the whole process has taken only three years from its 
inception to the present, it will be possible to examine a variety of factors 
and perspectives. The span of time has not been so great as to render specific 
issues so complex to be unwieldy to describe. Nor has it been so long as to 
fade memories or to see a great deal of change in persons involved. Most of 
those now working with the project have been with it since it began. Resources 
are divers, complete, and accessible without being voluminous. The role of 
public information, the organization and effects of opposition, and the prob- 
lems and prizes of a public-private development venture will be described and 
examined. Interrelationships between community activities and the redevelop- 
ment process will be described. 
Methodologically this report will be written from the perspective of a -pertici- 
pant observer. Considering the complexity of the issues which will be ad- 
dressed, this would be a particularly useful approach for examining the plan- 
ning process and for gaining insight into the significance of events. 
